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Introduction 
 
[...] the Council will in particular undertake [to] exchange views on political matters of 
common interest within the scope of the Treaty [and] consider what further action should be 
taken under Article 2 of the Treaty [...] 
-North Atlantic Council Resolution, 18 May 1950
1
 
[…]The Ministers discussed the problems of long-term planning within the Alliance in the 
non-military sphere […] dealing with the future development and role of the Alliance in the 
political, economic, civil emergency planning and other fields […] 
-Final Communiqué, 8 May- 10 May 1961
2
 
 
The subject of this thesis is the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation, informally 
known as the Three Wise Men. The Committee of Three was set up by the North Atlantic 
Council at its May 1956 Ministerial Meeting, and was tasked with advising the NAC “on 
ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to 
develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community”.3 
As is evident from the above quoted resolution passed by the NAC in 1950, the interest in 
increasing non-military cooperation, particularly political consultations, was nothing new in 
1956. Yet, as is evident from the final communiqué from 1961, only five years on the need for 
increasing non-military cooperation was a still an issue at Ministerial Meetings. The 
continued emphasis on the need for extending non-military cooperation in the Alliance would 
suggest that the Committee of Three was not very successful in its task. There is a distinct 
lack of literature on the work of the Three Wise Men and the results of their work, or lack 
thereof. It is usually only mentioned in juxtaposition with the Harmel Report of 1967, which 
is widely credited with mapping out NATO‟s future as a political entity.4 Further, it is widely 
thought that the results of the report of the Committee of Three were negated by the Suez 
crisis. The Anglo-French invasion of Egypt and the resulting tension within the Alliance have 
                                                 
1
 NATO Archives, North Atlantic Council Resolution, 18 May 1950.  
2
 NATO Archives, Final Communiqué, 8 May- 10 May 1961. 
3
 NATO Archives, North Atlantic Council, “Final Communiqué, 4 May- 6 May 1956”.  
4
 Lawrence S. Kaplan, “The 40th Anniversary of the Harmel Report”, NATO Review Spring 2007, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue1/english/history.html, accessed on 17 March 2007.  
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been seen as a case in point of the lack of unity within NATO, at precisely the same time that 
the Three Wise Men were working to strengthen cooperation within the alliance. 
 
i. Approach to the Problem 
This thesis aims to investigate several questions concerning the work of the Committee of 
Three in particular and non-military cooperation in NATO in general. The chosen approach to 
the problem divides these questions into three separate areas. First, what was the background 
for the Committee of Three, what was their stated task and how was this task accomplished? 
What effect did the Suez Crisis have on their work? Second, what were the Norwegian and 
US positions on non-military cooperation, and how can these be immediately explained? In 
this there is also a comparative dimension. What were the differences and similarities in these 
positions? Finally, how can we understand the Committee of Three and the Norwegian and 
US positions on non-military cooperation in relation to the bigger picture of the transatlantic 
relationship and the history of NATO. 
 
ii. Method  
The thesis is based on archival material in Norway and the US, as well as in the NATO 
Archives, supplemented by relevant secondary literature. Before giving a detailed survey over 
the archival material and secondary literature, there are several methodological considerations 
that need to be explained, as well as certain methodological problems that need to be 
addressed.    
A primary methodological consideration that was faced early on was the choice of archival 
material. Due to time constraints and the limited scope of the thesis, the task of investigating 
attitudes towards non-military cooperation in every member government was quite simply not 
possible. Therefore the selection was narrowed down to Norway and the US. However, this 
selection may be said to be adequate for two reasons. First, through the work of Halvard 
Lange on this Committee Norway was certainly a central actor. Lange was an ardent and 
vocal supporter of increased non-military cooperation and Atlantic unity throughout the 
1950‟s. Secondly, Norway was in many ways a representative of a third tier of member 
nations in NATO in terms of size of population, GDP and military clout, along with nations 
such as Denmark and the Benelux countries. The Danish position in particular largely 
v 
 
coincided with the Norwegian one. The inclusion of the US on the other hand seems self-
evident. The US was of course the central actor in any matter concerning NATO. In addition 
to this, there was a close bilateral relationship between Norway and the US. This relationship 
was so close, in fact, that it has been termed an “alliance within the alliance”.5  
The selection of the US and the Norwegian positions as a basis for the thesis presents certain 
methodological problems. Again, even with this limitation the sheer volume of archival 
material, particularly in the US, represents a daunting task for the researcher. The amount of 
available material is so vast, and spread between different locations and files, that a complete 
investigation of all relevant material proved impossible within the scope of the thesis. The 
focus was thus placed on the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park. 
The situation in Norway is less problematic in terms of volume, yet more problematic in 
terms of accessibility and availability. In particular, problems were faced in investigating the 
views of Lange himself, as there are no collections of his papers to be found either at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Riksarkiv or the Labour Movement‟s Archives.    
The secondary literature also presents methodological problems. Writing Cold War history 
after the end of the Cold War obviously gives the historian a perspective on events that was 
not possible during the period itself. Simply the knowledge that the period has a definite end 
affords a different outlook. In addition, the time that has passed since the end of the Cold War 
enables the historian to study the period as a distinct era. Further, due to the necessarily 
different outlooks of historians writing during and after the Cold War, it is imperative that one 
maintains a critical attitude to the literature. For example, it is important to note the fact that 
of the literature written during the Cold War, almost all of it is written from a Western 
vantage point. Thus only one side of the conflict is represented. This problem has been 
mitigated greatly since the end of the Cold War, for example through new literature based on 
recently opened archives in the East.  
 
iii. Secondary Literature 
Norwegian foreign policy during the Cold War has been analysed extensively by Norwegian 
historians. In Integration and Screening: the two faces of Norwegian alliance policy, 1945-
1986, written in 1986, Rolf Tamnes argues that there emerged a dialectic in Norwegian 
                                                 
5
 Knut Einar Eriksen and Helge Ø. Pharo, Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie, bind 5: Kald krig og 
internasjonalisering, 1949-196 5, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), 77. 
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alliance policy “after World War II between “the two faces of deterrence and reassurance in 
relation to the Soviet Union”, and “the two interrelated faces of integration and screening in 
relation to the West and in alliance policy”.6 Tamnes points to the duality of Norwegian 
foreign policy during the Cold War. On the one hand, Norway abandoned its traditions of 
neutrality and isolationism and joined “a far-reaching Atlantic Process of Integration” with 
the establishment of NATO. On the other hand, there was a second security dimension in 
Norwegian foreign policy, which entailed a policy of screening towards the NATO allies to 
“avoid the possibility of the Western powers using Norway for offensive operations against 
the Soviet Union”.7 A similar duality between nationalism and internationalism in Norwegian 
foreign policy has been pointed out by Geir Lundestad. Lundestad argues that despite the 
vocal support for international cooperation, there was a great deal of scepticism towards 
concrete suggestions for cooperation, usually leading to the conclusion that if Norway was to 
participate at all, it would need special arrangements.
8
 
A more general analysis of Norwegian foreign policy is presented by Knut Einar Eriksen and 
Helge Ø. Pharo in their volume of Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie, written in 1997. Eriksen 
and Pharo argue that Norwegian foreign policy can be seen as operating within four distinct 
circles: a global, an Atlantic, a European and a Nordic circle.
9
 Of these four circles, the 
Atlantic circle was viewed as the most important one by the foreign policy establishment.
10
 
This is not to say that even this Atlantic circle was unproblematic. On the contrary, the 
Atlantic cooperation through NATO and the Organization of European Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC) brought far more tension to the foreign policy establishment than any of 
the other circles. In particular, these tensions concerned questions of supranational structures 
and loss of sovereignty and freedom of action as a result of membership in international 
organizations such as NATO and OEEC, as well as the question of how to reconcile 
cooperation in these organizations with obligations to the UN.
11
 
                                                 
6
 Rolf Tamnes, “Integration and Screening: the two faces of Norwegian alliance policy, 1945-1986”, in FHFS 
notat 5-1986, (Oslo: Forsvarets høgskole, 1986), 3.  
7
 Ibid, 2. 
8
 Geir Lundestad, “Nasjonalisme og internasjonalisme i norsk utenrikspolitikk. Et faglig provoserende essay”, in 
Norsk utenrikspolitikk: perspektiver og sammenhenger, (Oslo: Norsk utenrikspolitisk institutt, 1985), 41.   
9
 Eriksen and Pharo, Kald krig og internasjonalisering, 15; see also Knut Einar Eriksen and Helge Ø. Pharo, ”De 
fire sirklene i norsk utenrikspolitikk, 1949-1961”, in Danmark, Norden og NATO 1948-1962, (Copenhagen: 
Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forl., 1991), 193.  
10
 Eriksen and Pharo, Kald krig og internasjonalisering, 16. 
11
 Ibid. 
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The existing body of literature concerning US foreign policy during the Cold War is 
comprehensive. Thus it has been necessary to focus on literature concerning the transatlantic 
relationship, and NATO in particular. Geir Lundestad has characterised the relationship 
between the US and Western Europe as an empire by invitation. Lundestad argues that the 
American role in the post-war world in many ways resembled that of an empire, albeit a 
somewhat unusual one compared to for example the British Empire of the 19
th
 century. 
However, Lundestad does not use the term empire in the strict sense, which would signify 
formalised political control over another states‟ policies, but rather to connotate “a 
hierarchical system of political relationships with one power clearly being much stronger than 
any other.”12 According to Lundestad, this role of empire in the relationship with Western 
Europe was in many ways a result of explicit European invitations, both in the economic and 
the military spheres. On the one hand, the European nations participating in the Marshall Plan 
all showed a great interest in involving the US as intimately as possible in their economic 
affairs.
13
 On the military side, the European countries put great pressure on the US to join in 
taking responsibility for the security of Western Europe. These efforts were successful 
through the establishment of NATO. However, it is important to note that the success of the 
European efforts would not have been possible if they had not been supported by important 
groups in the US foreign policy establishment. Nonetheless, the process on the American side 
was speeded up and facilitated by the European pressure. After the establishment of NATO, 
the European invitations continued through questions concerning the further organization of 
the alliance. The US was, as a result of pressure from practically all the member nations, 
represented on the Defence Committee, the Military Committee and the Standing Group, all 
of which were established at the first session of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). In 
addition, the US was represented in two of the Regional Planning Groups, and had a 
consultative role on the other three Regional Planning Groups. In addition to the Planning 
Groups, after the Korean War the Europeans worked to establish an integrated force in 
Europe, to be commanded by an American. This was accomplished with the appointment of 
General Eisenhower as SACEUR, along with the dispatching of four additional US divisions 
to Europe and an increase in military assistance to the European member nations.
14
 In 
summary, Lundestad presents the argument that in order to avoid an American withdrawal 
                                                 
12
 Geir Lundestad, The American “Empire” and other studies of US foreign policy in a comparative perspective, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 37. 
13
 Geir Lundestad, “Nasjonalisme og internasjonalisme i norsk utenrikspolitikk. Et faglig provoserende essay”, 
in Internasjonal Politikk (Temahefte 1), (Oslo: Norsk utenrikspolitisk institutt, 1985), 269. 
14
 Ibid, 270-272.  
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from European affairs, as had been the case after World War I, the Europeans extended 
invitations in three „rounds‟. First, requests for economic assistance, then requests for political 
support and military guarantees, and finally requests for a strong American military presence 
in Europe.
15
 
Lawrence S. Kaplan has written extensively on NATO and the transatlantic relationship. 
Kaplan concentrates on the differences within the Alliance, particularly between the US and 
the European members. In his account of NATO in the 1950‟s, he points to the impact of the 
Korean War as the main unifying factor in the transatlantic relationship. At the same time he 
maintains that the US, in the process of transforming NATO to meet the Soviet military 
challenge, created new divisions between itself and its allies, particularly France and the 
UK.
16
 As examples he mentions the British frustrations over being denied the SACATLANT 
and an autonomous Mediterranean command, the French-American disputes over the EDC 
and Indochina, the resentment of the smaller nations towards “the NATO method” of decision 
making and the Icelandic-American conflict over the base agreement. Kaplan‟s argument is 
that the limits and freedoms of all the allies were evident in these disagreements. Each 
European member had grievances with the US, and each made these grievances clear. 
However, no one contemplated disengagement because the Cold War “provided a check on 
transatlantic passions”.17 In other words, though Kaplan‟s focus is on conflict within the 
transatlantic relationship, he nonetheless recognizes the limitations the Cold War placed on 
these internal conflicts. 
According to Lundestad, on the other hand, the Atlantic Alliance should not be characterized 
as having been beset with conflict and disagreement. On the contrary, the striking feature of 
NATO in juxtaposition with other alliances throughout history is the closeness of cooperation. 
After all, NATO has lasted more than half a century, without defections, and throughout the 
period popular support in most member countries has been strong.
18
 Far from becoming 
obsolete, the Alliance has expanded several times. The 1950‟s alone saw the accession of 
Germany, Turkey and Greece. This view is supported by John Lewis Gaddis, who points out 
                                                 
15
 Geir Lundestad, Ed., No end to alliance: the United States and Western Europe: past, present and future, 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1998), 6. 
16
 Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO Divided, NATO United. The Evolution of an Alliance, (Westport, CT. : Praeger, 
2004), 10-11. 
17
 Kaplan, NATO Divided, NATO United, 27. 
18
 Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe since 1945, (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2003), 
5-7. 
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that the history of NATO is one of compromise
19
. However, while Lundestad explains this by 
pointing to the common interests, ideology and culture that were shared on both sides of the 
Atlantic, as well as the continued European “invitations”, Gaddis sees the willingness of the 
US to compromise from a position of strength as a result of democratic tradition. In his 
opinion, democratic theory provides a “rationale for diffusing power to strengthen a shared 
purpose” (original emphasis).20 
There is no literature that relates the work of the Committee of Three. As mentioned above, 
the Committee is only mentioned in passing in relation to the Harmel Report or the Suez 
Crisis. Kaplan discusses the Committee briefly in an article concerning the Harmel Report, as 
well as in his book NATO Divided, NATO United. Kaplan characterizes the work on the 
Harmel Report as fundamentally different from the work of the Committee of Three due to 
the participation of both smaller and larger alliance members. The Committee of Three, on the 
other hand, was a “cri-de-cœur of smaller nations” that felt excluded from the decision 
making process, and was in any case “overshadowed” by the Suez Crisis.21  
  
iv. Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter One concerns non-military cooperation in NATO and the Committee of Three in 
particular. A brief survey of the history of non-military cooperation in NATO is provided, as 
well as the immediate background for the establishment of the Committee of Three. Further, 
the work and proceedings of the Committee are detailed, and its final report is summarized. 
Finally, the treatment of the report at the December 1956 Ministerial Meeting is briefly 
recounted. 
Chapters two and three focus on the Norwegian and US positions on non-military cooperation 
respectively. The replies to the questionnaire circulated by the Committee are summarized, 
and the positions contained therein are explained by examining the immediate factors that lay 
behind them.  
                                                 
19
 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know. Rethinking Cold War History, (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1997), 
202. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Lawrence S. Kaplan, “The 40th Anniversary of the Harmel Report”; Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO Divided, 
NATO United, 25.  
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Chapter Four gives a comparative analysis of the Norwegian and US positions on non-
military cooperation, and places these positions and the work of the Committee of Three in a 
larger context of Cold War history.   
The concluding chapter provides a general conclusion before placing the Committee of Three 
in the bigger picture of Cold War history, the history of Norwegian foreign policy and the 
history of the transatlantic relationship.  
 
1 
 
Chapter One- The Committee of Three on Non-Military 
Cooperation 
 
Although the Alliance was only seven years old in 1956, the idea of it becoming something 
more than simply a military alliance geared towards defending Western Europe from the 
spectre of Communism was not new. It seemed that the threat emanating from the Soviet Bloc 
was taking on a new form; since the death of Stalin in 1953, the new Soviet leadership had 
changed its tone. Whereas the message had previously been that the triumph of socialism was 
inevitable, the Soviets were now championing their new concept of “peaceful co-existence”.22 
This shift in strategy encouraged the already familiar idea of using NATO as a vehicle for 
non-military cooperation in addition to the well-established military side.   
That is not to say that one was meeting a new challenge with an old reply. The concept of an 
“Atlantic Community”, even an “Atlantic Union”, had been around for a few years already, 
and had many proponents on both sides of the Atlantic. But while some Atlantic enthusiasts 
envisioned a supranational entity to rival the Soviet Bloc, what the NATO members now had 
in mind was something far less enveloping, yet perhaps far more realistic. Relinquishing 
sovereignty, particularly in matters of foreign and security policy, was perhaps never a 
reasonable prospect in an alliance of 15 members that in no way constituted a homogenous 
group.  
This chapter will give an account of the work of the Three Wise Men. However, before 
detailing the endeavours of the Committee, it is necessary to delineate the backdrop to the 
proceedings. The first section gives a brief history of the previous attempts at extending 
cooperation to non-military fields. The second section will deal with the May 1956 
Ministerial Meeting of the NAC, and the setting up of the Committee. The third section 
recounts the work of the Committee, from the establishment in May until the submission of its 
report in December. The fourth section analyzes the final report of the Committee, and the 
discussions surrounding it at the December 1956 Ministerial Meeting of the NAC.  
                                                 
22
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS hereafter), 1955-57, vol. XXIV, (Washington D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1989), 64. 
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1.1 A brief history of non-military cooperation in NATO 
The history of non-military cooperation stretches back to the very beginning of the Alliance. 
The North Atlantic Treaty contains articles that allow for the extension of cooperation from 
strictly military matters to fields of a non-military character. The signatories thus envisioned a 
closer-knit association than a mere multilateral agreement of mutual defence. However, the 
wording of the articles leaves ample room for interpretation. Through the seven years from 
the signing of the Treaty until the establishment of the Committee of Three, attempts were 
made at explicating the possibilities for an extension of cooperation afforded by the Treaty. 
The most substantial of these was the establishment of the Committee of Five on the North 
Atlantic Community in 1951, whose endeavours are briefly recounted below. Its report was 
adopted by the NAC in 1952. But only three years later the subject was again on the table at 
the Ministerial Meeting in December 1955.  
 
1.1.1 Non-military cooperation in the North Atlantic Treaty 
The North Atlantic Treaty consists of 14 articles, as well as a preamble. Of these, the 
preamble and Articles 2 and 4 relate to non-military cooperation. The Preamble of the Treaty 
states that the signatories “are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and 
civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and 
the rule of law.”23 The mention of „common heritage‟ and „civilization‟ is revisited several 
times in the US answers to the questionnaire circulated by the Committee of Three.
24
 Further, 
the Preamble states that the members “seek to promote stability and well-being in the North 
Atlantic Area”.25  
Thus, in addition to preserving the freedom of the member nations, the Alliance is tasked with 
protecting the shared legacy and traditions of the members. Such concepts can, of course, not 
be adequately defended from a foe using non-military tactics by agreeing to obligations of 
mutual defence. It is necessary to extend obligations into non-military fields. While it may 
seem that the Preamble is general in its wording, the mention of “civilisation” and “common 
heritage” can easily be interpreted as pointing the way towards cultural cooperation.   
                                                 
23
 NATO Handbook 2001, (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 527. 
24
 National Archives (NA hereafter), Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, “US answers to the NATO 
questionnaire”. Dated 30 August, 1956.   
25
 NATO Handbook 2001, 527. 
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Article 2 states that the signatories will “contribute toward the further development of 
peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by 
bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are 
founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well being” and further to “seek to 
eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and ... encourage economic 
collaboration between any or all of them”.26 The second half of the article is clear in its 
objective: to strengthen economic cooperation between the members. It is evident that some 
form of economic cooperation was envisaged already at the founding of the Alliance, and 
indeed, the field of economic cooperation would be central in the work of the Committee of 
Three. 
The first half of Article 2 also contains provisions that allow for non-military cooperation. 
The Committee of Three would, in addition to economic cooperation, also examine the 
possibilities of cooperation in the information field. This was understood not only in terms of 
propaganda, but also in terms of distributing factual information about NATO and its 
members, with a view to increase public understanding of the Alliance and its goals.  
While the Preamble is rather vaguely worded, and Article 2 mainly concerns economic 
collaboration, Article 4 on the other hand concerns political consultation. It states that 
members will “consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial 
integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”27 Though it 
may seem that the wording of this Article is unequivocal, the wording was deemed by some to 
be too vague. In the words of Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak, Article 4 “c'est 
celui qui prévoit les consultations politiques mais dans les termes si généraux et si vagues 
qu'on peut à la fois être fidèles au Pacte en ne faisant rien du tout, et en faisant tout.” (”is one 
which provides for political consultation, but in terms so general and so vague that one can be 
faithful to the Pact both by doing nothing at all, and by doing everything.”) (My 
translation)
28
 It was his opinion that it was necessary to “draw up a formula defining the 
method of application”.29    
                                                 
26
 NATO Handbook 2001, 527. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 NATO Archives, North Atlantic Council , C-VR (56) 20, “ Verbatim Record of Proceedings, 4 May, 1956, 
Morning”.  
29
 NATO Archives, North Atlantic Council, C-R (56) 20, “Summary Record of Proceedings, 4 May, 1956, 
Morning”.  
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Thus, the Treaty lays down provisions for extending cooperation into the fields of political 
consultation, economic collaboration, cultural cooperation and cooperation in the field of 
information. 
 
1.1.2 The Committee of the North Atlantic Community 
The subject of non-military cooperation had, as already mentioned, previously been worked 
on by a Ministerial Committee in 1951. The Committee on the North Atlantic Community, 
informally known as the Pearson Group, was established at the Seventh Session of the NAC 
in Ottawa in September 1951. Its purpose was to “consider further strengthening of the NA 
Community and especially implementation of Art II” of the Treaty.30 The Committee‟s 
mandate was to “consider and make recommendations” on matters including “coordination 
and frequent consultation on foreign policy”; “close economic, financial and social 
cooperation”; and “collaboration in fields of culture and public information”.31 Not only were 
these tasks identical to those of the Committee of Three established five years later, but both 
Canadian Minister for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson and Norwegian Foreign Minister 
Halvard Lange worked on both Committees.  
The Committee on the North Atlantic Community was to submit its report to the Council at 
the following session, to be held in Rome in November 1951. At the session in Rome only an 
interim report was submitted, and the Committee was directed to continue its work. This was, 
however, seen only as a minor problem.
32
 The Committee‟s final report was submitted at the 
next Council session in Lisbon in February 1952. The report contained recommendations on 
movement of labour, coordination and consultation on foreign policy, social and cultural 
cooperation and information activities.
33
  
The Final Communiqué released after the Lisbon session of the NAC states that since the 
matters dealt with by the Committee of Five was “of direct and common concern to each 
member of the Council”, it was decided that “future work in this sphere should be transferred 
to the Council”.34 The responsibility for implementing its recommendations and for future 
study of the matter thus lay with the Permanent Council. The fact that non-military 
                                                 
30
 FRUS, 1951, vol. III, (Washington D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), 688. 
31
 Ibid.  
32
 Ibid, 753. 
33
 FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. V, (Washington D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 180-190. 
34
 Ibid, 179. 
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cooperation was still the subject of discussion in 1956 would suggest that the Council failed at 
this task, or that the situation had changed. Particularly in terms of the need for political 
consultation, which all parties seemed to agree on, at least in principle, development did not 
follow the course set out by the Committee of Five.
35
 
It would be a likely assumption that in spite of pledges of agreement in principle from all 
member nations, the will to discuss political questions in the Council was lacking. It is a 
commonly asserted belief that it is the smaller nations in an alliance that stand to profit from 
increased political consultation.
36
 Allowing for more input from smaller nations regarding the 
policies of larger nations, if such input is taken into consideration in policy formation of 
course, would give the smaller nations a degree of influence that is disproportionate to their 
material contribution to the alliance. At the same time, the larger nations do not necessarily 
gain any amount of influence over the policies of the smaller nations. However, it can also be 
concluded that the lack of discussion evident here was due to the reluctance of smaller 
member nations to discuss political matters in the Council.
37
 This phenomenon, known as le 
refus d’opinion, a term coined by Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak, implies a refusal by a 
member country to explain its position in the process of consultation.
38
  
The seeming lack of results from the work of the Committee of Five on the North Atlantic 
Community may also simply be a matter of unfortunate timing. At the Ninth Session of the 
NAC in Lisbon in 1952, the Council adopted the report of the Committee. In addition, 
however, the Lisbon meeting resulted in the appointment of a Secretary General and the 
setting up of a Permanent Council. Ambitious new force level goals were agreed upon, and 
the European Defence Community was discussed. Agreement was reached on further 
financing of the infrastructure programme.
39
 Such extensive changes in the Organization 
stand out as a seminal event in its evolution, and it may be that the report of the Committee of 
Five simply drowned in the midst of this reorganization.      
Whatever the reasons may be for the apparent failure of the Committee of Five on the North 
Atlantic Community, the international situation was changing, and in December 1955 the 
issue of implementing Article 2 was once again on the Agenda.     
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1.1.3 The December 1955 Ministerial Meeting 
On departing for Paris on 13 December, Secretary Dulles stated that the meeting would deal 
“not only with the military problems which … [NATO] always has to deal with but to 
exchange views about the significance of the Soviet Action during recent months.”40 It is 
evident that the Geneva Summit in July 1955 had left an impression. Under the discussion of 
Agenda item II, Review of the International Situation, Dulles described the position of the 
Soviet Union as “ambiguous; smiling but hard beneath”.41 There was a definite impression 
that Soviet tactics had changed. The new Soviet threat was an “attempt to undermine Western 
World by economic and political means”, as it was expressed by Italian Foreign Minister 
Gaetano Martino, who would later work on the Committee of Three.
42
 
In the discussions under Agenda item IV, concerning implementation of Article 2, Martino 
proposed that the problem of implementation be studied at the Permanent Representative 
level, and be discussed at the next Ministerial Meeting. In the course of the discussion it 
became clear that there was a difference of opinion as to what constituted the best possible 
solution for meeting the new Soviet threat. Some members, such as Italy, Greece and Turkey 
focused primarily on economic matters such as coordination of policies and aid to 
underdeveloped areas, both outside and within the NATO area. Others, such as Canada, 
Denmark and Norway focused more on cultural questions and political consultation. In the 
end, a resolution was adopted supporting Martino‟s suggestion.43 This divergence in focus 
between economic, cultural and political questions would continue at the next Ministerial 
Meeting. 
  
1.2 The May 1956 Ministerial Meeting 
If the atmosphere at the previous Ministerial Meeting had been characterized by concern over 
Soviet intentions as a result of the Geneva Summit, the atmosphere at the May 1956 
Ministerial Meeting was strongly influenced by the results of the 20
th
 Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. At this Congress the Soviet leadership turned away 
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from the Stalinist emphasis on the inevitability of war with the West, and also voiced support 
for the peaceful transition to socialism using parliamentary mechanisms, rather than 
revolution.
44
 At the same time that it emphasised that peaceful co-existence was the only 
alternative to nuclear war, the Congress called for the development of friendly relations 
“throughout the world”, with particular focus on underdeveloped countries.45 
It was in this atmosphere of concern that the Committee of Three on Non-Military 
Cooperation would be established. Martino‟s suggestion at the previous meeting had been 
acted upon, and the issue of implementation of Article 2 would see thorough discussion at the 
May 1956 Ministerial Meeting. As a basis for the discussions the International Staff had 
prepared a Survey of Article 2 activities. Also, the specific issue of political consultation 
would be discussed, as well as information policy.
46
  
 
1.2.1 Countering the new Soviet tactics 
The concern over the international situation is evident from the Agenda. Item 2 concerned the 
“International Situation in light of Current Developments”, hereunder “Trends and 
Implications of Soviet Policy Including the Political and Economic Penetration of 
Underdeveloped Countries”; and “Political and Economic Questions Arising from Current 
Soviet Tactics.”47  
The discussion on item 2(a) of the agenda, concerning “Trends and Implications of Soviet 
Policy”, would revolve around the apparent changed nature of the Soviet challenge. The 
Turkish Foreign Minister Koprulu pointed out that the Soviets had also previously called for 
peaceful coexistence when they needed peaceful frontiers in order to cope with internal 
problems. The same was the case now, he maintained. The Soviet goal was still world 
domination.
48
 Koprulu also commented that the Soviets, in the period following the summit at 
Geneva, had seemed to prefer bilateral contacts with NATO members. This made it necessary 
to “establish as close political coordination as possible”.49  
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While some nations maintained that there were no changes to be found in Soviet motivations, 
others saw merit in East-West contacts. Lange stated the opinion that “Soviet leaders may be 
groping for way out of complete isolation” and that their seeming desire for lessened tensions 
might be sincere. Danish Foreign Minister Hans Christian Hansen did not go as far, but stated 
that as long as the West did not lose sight of the “real motives behind Soviet readiness to be 
on „speaking terms‟”, East-West contacts could be continued and might in fact turn the scales 
in favour of the West. Italy on the other hand, was apprehensive about East-West contacts due 
to the presence of a strong Communist party in Italy. Although this was also the case in 
France, the Italian sentiment found no agreement with French Foreign Minister Pineau, who 
held the opposite view.
50
 It is evident that although there was general agreement that the 
Soviet Union still posed a grave threat to the West, and that its tactics had changed, there was 
no clear agreement on Soviet motives or the desirability of East-West contacts.  
Item 2(b) of the agenda concerned political and economic questions arising from the changed 
Soviet tactics. As with the previous agenda item, the discussion showed that while there was 
agreement on a general level that increased non-military cooperation might provide the best 
means of countering the new Soviet tactics, there was disagreement on exactly what forms of 
cooperation provided the best chances of success. Italy, for example, had already made it clear 
that its focus was on economic questions. As early as 12 April the Italian Delegation had 
circulated a memorandum titled “Future Action under Article 2”.51  This memorandum 
referred to the resolution, proposed by Italy and adopted at the previous Ministerial Meeting, 
which instructed the Permanent Council to examine and implement measures conducive to 
closer cooperation “as envisaged in Article 2”.52 The memorandum further states that “the 
consultations which have been taking place for some time among the NATO members can 
already be considered as a first satisfactory step”. Thus the focus is clearly placed on 
strengthening economic collaboration, particularly as a “consequence of the threat from the 
Soviet economic offensive”.53 At the meeting Italy proceeded to propose a resolution which 
would have the NAC periodically examine “economic problems with political implications”, 
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as well as intensifying cooperation in other organizations “in pursuance of the aims of the 
Alliance”.54 
 
1.2.2 Establishing the Committee of Three 
The suggestion to establish a ministerial committee to study the possibilities of extending 
non-military cooperation in NATO was put forward by Secretary Dulles in his remarks on 
Agenda Item III.
55
 While pointing out that one of three tasks facing the Alliance at the time 
was to “create … bonds of unity … between members to avoid internal conflict” which could 
be exploited by the Soviets and the Chinese, Dulles suggested the formation of committee of 
two or three members to “undertake urgently to consult with each of the members … with a 
view to reporting not later than next fall how … the Atlantic Community can best further 
organize itself to deal with the problems that lie ahead”.56 When the meeting resumed the 
following day, British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd seconded Dulles‟ suggestion of a 
committee to deal with the matter of non-military cooperation, as it would be difficult to give 
adequate thought to the matter in a two day meeting. He also suggested the proposed 
committee consist of Pearson, Lange and Martino, a suggestion which was subsequently 
endorsed by Dulles.
57
 The apparent harmony of the American and British action is not 
surprising, considering that Dulles and Lloyd had discussed the matter at length in bilateral 
talks on 4 May.
58
   
Lange‟s reaction to the idea of establishing a committee was to urge that a precise definition 
of the goal of the committee be given immediately, while Pearson commented on the 
difficulties such a committee would face. Martino did not comment on the suggestion. 
Lange‟s wish for a precise definition was not fulfilled, and at Secretary-General Ismay‟s 
suggestion the NAC adopted a proposal giving interim approval to set up a “Committee of 
Three to undertake work, which would be defined later”.59 This rather vague conclusion 
presented a problem in framing the terms of reference for the Committee. In particular, Lange 
“insisted that the directives to the Committee be precise” and wanted a special Council 
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meeting to be held in two months specifically to formulate the terms of reference, after the 
Permanent Representatives and member governments had had time to study the matter. 
However, in the end it was decided that the Committee should formulate its own terms of 
reference.
60
   
In formulating the Committee‟s terms of reference, the Committee members consulted on the 
matter with a few other member governments, but far from all. Pearson consulted with Dulles 
on 12 June 1956, stating that he thought the study “should be more than a list of 
recommendations”. Dulles replied that the State Department had set up a Working Group to 
consider the problem, but that it had not yet concluded. However, this Working Group was 
“proceeding on the premise that the Ministerial Committee of Three had a broad mandate, 
embracing an examination of the possibilities of building closer Atlantic Unity through 
various media, including but not restricted to the North Atlantic Council.”61  
Lange was also made aware of Dulles‟ general thoughts on how the Committee should 
proceed. In an Aide Mémoire delivered to Lange on 14 May 1956, it was communicated that 
in Dulles‟ opinion, “it would … appear appropriate that the three Foreign Ministers regard 
their role primarily as that of carrying forward the debate started at the recent Paris 
meeting”.62 In addition, Lange discussed the matter with German Foreign Minister Von 
Brentano, who agreed with Lange that the job of the Committee was to “ascertain realistically 
how far the members of NATO, especially the great power members of NATO, were willing 
to go in this field”.63 
In the end, as is stated in the Committee‟s final report, the terms of reference were interpreted 
as requiring the Committee “to examine and re-define the objectives and needs of the 
Alliance, especially in light of current international developments”, and “to make 
recommendations for strengthening its internal solidarity, cohesion and unity”.64  
                                                 
60
 NA, Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62, D 181, CF 809, “B-3.51: The History of the Committee of 
Three”. Undated background paper prepared for the December 1956 Ministerial Meeting.  
61
 NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, “CA-10252. Conversation with Foreign Minister Pearson 
on Developing Atlantic Unity.” Dated 22 June, 1956. The conversation took place on 11 June, 1956. 
62
 NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, ”Aide Mémoire, based on Deptel 1126”. Dated 14 May, 
1956. The telegram that is referred to, “Deptel 1126”, instructs the Chiefs of Mission in Oslo, Rome and Ottawa 
to discuss with the respective Foreign Ministers the responsibilities of the Committee of Three, and to convey 
Dulles‟ own thoughts as to how they should proceed. 
63
 NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, ”Foreign Service Despatch 706. Norwegian Discussions 
with German Foreign Minister Von Brentano”,  Dated 1 June, 1956.  
64
 NATO Archives, C-M (56) 127 (Revised), “Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation 
in NATO”, 5. Circulated to the Permanent Delegations on 10 January, 1957.  
11 
 
 
1.3 The Work of the Committee 
So it was that the Committee of Three, or the Three Wise Men as they would be known, was 
established at the suggestion of two of the Great Powers in the Alliance, and it was to consist 
of the Foreign Ministers of three of the smaller powers, at least in terms of military clout. 
They would gather in Paris twice, once in June and once in September. Their report would be 
submitted at the Ministerial Meeting in December 1956. But in the period between May and 
December, the Alliance would be put under great internal strain as France and the UK split 
with the United States over the Suez Crisis. And within the Committee two of its three 
members would at times express serious doubts as to the purpose of their work. 
 
1.3.1 The First Session: June 1956 
The Committee decided to hold its first round of meetings in Paris in June 1956. It was agreed 
upon that the preparatory work would be carried out by the Permanent Representatives from 
Italy, Canada and Norway, in collaboration with the Secretary General. Consultations with 
individual governments were planned, but it was felt that these should be deferred until 
Pearson had obtained the views of Washington and London, and the Committee had had time 
to meet. Behind this lay a wish to have some concrete proposals to discuss with the individual 
governments, and that these take into account the thoughts of Washington and London.
65
 This 
is not to say that the subject was off limits in the meanwhile. Lange, for example, broached 
the subject in discussions with German Foreign Minister von Brentano on 29 May when he 
visited Oslo, and again when he consulted with Danish Foreign Minister Hansen in 
Copenhagen on 12 June.
66
 
At their meetings on 20-22 June 1956, the Committee compiled a questionnaire that was to be 
circulated to all the individual governments, to be turned in by 20 August. This questionnaire 
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was closely based upon a draft paper proffered by the Italian representative.
67
 It is interesting, 
however, to note the differences between the Italian draft and the final questionnaire. The 
Italian draft does not mention the cultural field at all. It has a clear focus on economic 
cooperation, and to a lesser degree political consultation and the possible necessity for 
organizational changes to allow for greater economic and political cooperation. This is not 
surprising. As is made clear in a memorandum circulated by the Italian Delegation as early as 
April 1956, the Italians were at least initially focused solely on economic cooperation.
68
 It is 
clear from the sources that Lange was more interested in cultural cooperation than both his 
fellow Committee members, particularly Martino. The idea for establishing a common 
research institute for Atlantic Community Studies was developed by Lange and Danish 
Foreign Minister Hansen.
69
 The question of recruitment and training of technicians was 
another issue Lange had a penchant for. At the same time, too much should not be made of 
this. The clear focus of the Committee of Three was political consultation and economic 
cooperation, as is evident from the questionnaire itself, around half of which concerned 
political and economic questions.   
The results of the meetings on 20-22 June were substantial.
70
 In addition to the questionnaire, 
agreement was reached on how to proceed. It was decided that a second session would be held 
in September, after the individual governments had responded to the questionnaire. It was also 
decided that in order to assist the Committee in preparing the report, experts would be 
approached to serve as consultants on certain questions. Further, a fair amount of groundwork 
was delegated to the International Staff, such as preparing background documents on previous 
achievements in the non-military fields. It was also decided that certain non-member countries 
should be approached, as well as the NATO Parliamentary Committee and the Atlantic Treaty 
Association.  
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1.3.2 The Second Session: September 1956  
The second session of the Committee of Three was held on 10-22 September. The replies of 
the individual governments to the questionnaire were now in hand, and the Committee would 
now consult with each of the members, using their replies as a basis for discussion. The 
purpose of these consultations was to “clarify, where necessary, the positions taken by 
governments in their replies, and to obtain their views on a number of specific proposals 
selected from the different replies”.71 In addition to consulting with the individual 
governments, the Committee met with the Standing Committee of the Conference of 
Members of Parliament from NATO Countries, the Atlantic Treaty Organization and a 
delegation representing the Signatories of the Declaration of Atlantic Unity.  
The individual governments were for the most part represented by their Foreign Ministers. 
The exceptions were Iceland, who was represented by their Permanent Representative; the 
UK, who was represented by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Denmark, who 
was represented by the Deputy Foreign Minister; and the US, who was represented by Senator 
Walter George. There was initially some concern on the part of the Committee as to the 
perspicacity of consulting with the individual Foreign Ministers. Pearson in particular was 
apprehensive on this subject, since it was assumed from an early point that Secretary Dulles 
would be unable to travel to Paris in September. Pearson feared this would be misconstrued as 
a lack of interest on part of the US.
72
 However, in Washington it was felt that it was important 
for the Committee to consult the replies with representatives at a high level, even though 
Dulles would not attend.
73
 The Italians were on the other hand content with the participation 
of Senator George.
74
 
While the individual consultations did not uncover any radical novelties in the stated views of 
the member governments, they provided a chance for the individual governments to place 
extra emphasis on the questions which they considered most important. In addition, the 
Committee was able to meet with the Parliamentary Conference to hear their views. The 
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central theme in the consultation with the Parliamentary Conference was the importance of 
public opinion and parliamentarians‟ attitudes to NATO. It was felt that public support was 
faltering in many countries, and that there was a general cooling of attitudes towards NATO 
on the part of parliamentarians. In the opinion of the Parliamentary Conference, this could be 
countered by evolving common foreign policies and keeping the public informed about the 
political issues that were discussed in the Council. Support and aid to underdeveloped NATO 
countries was another suggestion thought to buttress public opinion. Not surprisingly, the 
Parliamentary Conference also advocated more formal recognition of the Conference by 
NATO, including some modest financial support.
75
 
 
1.3.3 Sinking Spirits 
In the course of the Committees work, its members at times questioned the possibilities of 
success. Martino and Lange in particular had doubts, as did many within the Foreign 
Ministries in Italy and Norway. In the case of Martino the doubts concerned the possibility of 
achieving any substantial results. Lange, on the other hand, expressed frustration at the lack of 
even rudimentary attempts at consultation during the Suez Crisis. 
Within the Italian Foreign Ministry there were doubts about Martino‟s “personal faith” in the 
Committee of Three, and thus his ability to make an effective contribution to its work.
76
 The 
opinion that the Committee would be unable to achieve any significant results was held by 
very senior staff in the Ministry, such as Secretary General Marquis Rossilonghi, who had 
formerly been the Italian Permanent Representative.
77
 This attitude seems to have been 
present already at the Ministerial Meeting in May 1956. It seems, however, that this 
scepticism was prevalent only in the early stages of the Committee‟s work, and that there 
evolved a more positive attitude after the first session of the Committee, at least among 
Foreign Ministry officials.
78
 The initial lack of confidence in the Italian Foreign Ministry 
may, at least in part, have been due to a feeling of frustration in course of their work on the 
                                                 
75
 NATO Archives, CT-R/2, “Summary Record: Committee of Three meeting with the Standing Committee of 
the Conference of Members of Parliament from the NATO Countries held on Wednesday, 12
th
 September”. 
Circulated to the Permanent Delegations on 27 September, 1956.  
76
 NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321,”Telegram DEPT 4103”. Sent from the US Embassy in 
Rome to the Department of State, Ottawa, Oslo and the Permanent Delegation to NATO on 5 June, 1956. 
77
 NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321,”Telegram DEPT 3900”. Sent from US Embassy in Rome 
to the Department of State, Ottawa, Oslo and the Permanent Delegation to NATO on 16 May, 1956.  
78
 NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321,”Telegram DEPT 5978”. US Embassy in London to the 
Department of State, Ottawa, Oslo, Rome and the Permanent Delegation to NATO on 26 June, 1956. 
15 
 
Italian position.
79
 A similar frustration was discernible also in the Norwegian Foreign 
Ministry. The Political Section, which was tasked with developing a working paper detailing 
the Norwegian position, apparently found that almost every idea they came up with had 
previously been studied and abandoned.
80
 It seems, however, that as the work of the 
Committee proceeded, the frustration waned.  
Whereas the first session of the Committee proved to bulwark confidence among the 
participants, the second session left fewer grounds for optimism in some quarters. Particularly 
the US reply to the questionnaire indubitably left some people wondering. The US reply 
maintained that its position in the global strategic landscape placed limitations on its ability to 
consult in a manner satisfactory to the Committee. This led Secretary General Ismay to advise 
the Committee to “enquire whether the United States believes that the … limitations can be 
sufficiently circumscribed to avoid crippling the effectiveness of NATO political 
consultation”.81 It seemed that the largest and most central member of the Alliance might 
prove unwilling to give a satisfactory commitment to consult on political questions in NATO. 
However, if the Committee was troubled at apparent lacking willingness to consult on the part 
of the US, it would be France and the United Kingdom that would raise the gravest doubts as 
to the possibility of achieving any results at all.  
The Suez Crisis and the complete lack of willingness to even inform the Council on the part 
of France and the United Kingdom led to doubts as to the point of continuing the work of the 
Committee. The Norwegian Permanent Representative Jens Boyesen communicated to the US 
delegation that Lange was contemplating resigning from the Committee, as he felt that “recent 
events had made a mockery of their proposed report”.82 The US advised that the situation that 
had arisen made it ever more important to strengthen the unity of the Alliance. It was 
appreciated that the report would be in need of some revisions, but the US requested that the 
Committee continue its work as planned.
83
 Boyesen himself also voiced frustration. While it 
was understood that due to time constraints advance consultation had not been feasible in this 
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case, “several days after the fact, the British and French delegations still seemed uninstructed 
and unable to give the Council any information”.84   
In the end the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation decided to revise their report 
in the wake of the Suez Crisis, and the finished report was distributed to the member 
governments on 16 November 1956. It is important to note that while the report was subjected 
to revision after Suez, the conclusions of the Committee did not change. The report would 
then be discussed at the Ministerial Meeting in December 1956.  
 
1.4 The Final Report and the December 1956 Ministerial Meeting 
When the report of the Committee of Three was submitted in November, it was accompanied 
by a letter of transmittal which pointed to the fact that, at least in terms of cooperation within 
the Alliance, the situation had changed greatly.
85
 The Suez Crisis was seen as an illustrative 
example of lacking willingness to use the consultative machinery of NATO. Indeed, the 
agenda of the December Ministerial Meeting shows that much of the focus of this meeting 
was on the international situation, particularly in the Middle East, in addition to the 
discussions surrounding the report of the Committee of Three. Considering the tensions 
within the Alliance so evident in the period leading up to the Ministerial Meeting, it might be 
expected that the discussions concerning the issue of political consultation would be 
characterized by antagonism and discord. This was, however, not the case.  
 
1.4.1 The Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation 
The final report of the Committee contained suggestions for extending cooperation in the four 
specific fields, and considerations in terms of any organizational or functional changes that 
would be necessary to achieve this. The issues of political consultation and economic 
cooperation received by far the most attention, while questions of cooperation in the cultural 
and information fields were afforded less. The tone of the report, perhaps particularly the 
introduction, was strongly influenced by the feeling that the Alliance was facing an internal 
crisis of disquieting proportions. Though the introduction was written before the Suez Crisis, 
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it was revised in mid-November, and it contained a striking amount of references to the 
internal tension that was so strongly felt at the time. However, it is an important point that 
these references are prominent only in the introduction, as well as the letter of transmittal that 
accompanied the report.   
The first section of the report, regarding political cooperation, began with some general 
remarks, which were basically a repetition of the conclusions of the Committee of Five: 
“…international cooperation… will depend largely on the extent to which member 
governments … take into consideration the interests of the Alliance. This requires not only the 
acceptance of the obligation of consultation and co-operation whenever necessary, but also 
the development of practices by which the discharge of this obligation becomes a normal part 
of governmental activity.”86 In other words, successful political cooperation was dependent on 
the willingness of the member governments to consult on political issues, and the 
development of a habit of consultation. The section dealt with three areas of political 
cooperation: political consultation; peaceful settlement of inter-member disputes; and 
cooperation with parliamentary associations in general, and the Parliamentary Conference in 
particular.  
With regard to political consultation, the report discussed both the scope and character of 
consultations and the preparations needed to facilitate consultations. While pointing to the fact 
that a habit of consultation had failed to develop to a satisfactory degree, the Committee 
stated that there was a need for more than simply “broadening the scope and deepening the 
character” of consultation.87 The goal should be to integrate the process of consultation into 
the normal formation of national policy, and to arrive, through collective discussion, at 
“timely agreement on common lines of policy and action”.88 
The report then went on to discuss some factors that limited political consultation. The first 
limitation mentioned was the time constraints faced in “a situation of extreme emergency… 
when action must be taken … before consultation is possible”.89 The second limitation that 
was discussed was the difficulty of specifying in advance what matters it would be necessary 
to discuss. The Committee quickly concluded that “experience is a better guide than 
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dogma”.90 Instead of a rigid regimen of rules and guidelines, the Committee recommended 
certain principles and practices. According to these principles member governments should 
inform of any developments that significantly affect the Alliance; they should have the right 
to raise any subject of common interest for discussion in the Council; they should as far as 
possible consult before adopting firm policies or make major political pronouncements; they 
should take into consideration the interests and views of their fellow members in developing 
national policies, even when no consensus has been reached.
91
  
To strengthen these proposed principles and practices, the Committee suggested that the 
Council in ministerial session discuss an annual political appraisal, based on an annual report 
to be prepared by the Secretary General. This report should give an analysis of major political 
problems, review the extent to which consultation has occurred and indicate future problems 
which may require consultation.
92
 The Committee went on to suggest that the Council create a 
Committee of Political Advisers to further facilitate preparation for consultation. This 
Committee would be constituted of members from each delegation, at times also aided by 
national experts. It was also suggested that current studies be included among its 
responsibilities, such as those on trends of Soviet policy.
93
 
In order to further promote the efficaciousness of political consultation, the Committee 
recommended that the Council adopt a resolution on peaceful settlement of inter-member 
disputes under article 1 of the Treaty, which stated that the signatories undertake to “settle any 
international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means”.94 With the proposed 
resolution, the members would reaffirm their obligation to settle disputes peacefully, agree to 
submit such disputes to good offices procedures within the Alliance framework, recognize the 
right of other members and the Secretary General to submit disputes to the Council, and to 
empower the Secretary General to offer his good offices at any time, and to nominate up to 
three Permanent Representatives to assist in enquiry and mediation.
95
 
The last part of the section concerning political cooperation contained recommendations on 
how NATO should cooperate with parliamentary associations. The Committee stated that 
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such associations were among NATO‟s most fervent supporters, and that the formation of 
such associations nationally and internationally had contributed greatly to developing public 
support for the Alliance. The Committee therefore recommended that the Secretary General 
continue to facilitate the work of the Parliamentary Conferences by placing the facilities of 
the NATO Headquarters at their disposal, and that the Secretary General and other senior 
NATO officials attend certain meetings in connection with these.
96
  
The second section of the report concerned economic cooperation. The point that willingness 
to discuss was paramount to effective cooperation was reiterated, and the common economic 
interests of the member governments were said to call for cooperative action, freedom in 
trade, payments, movement of manpower and movement of long-term capital, assistance to 
underdeveloped areas, and policies that underline “the superiority of free institutions”.97 
While the previous section concerning political cooperation seemed to emphasize the need for 
harmonizing policies, this section focused on common interests between the members.  
The Committee began by stating that while the principles of Article 2 were vitally important, 
it was not in the interest of NATO to duplicate the work done in other international 
organizations. In particular the report mentioned the OEEC, the GATT, the IMF, the IBRD, 
the IFC and various UN agencies, including the proposed SUNFED. While it was felt that 
“the common economic concerns … will often best be fostered by continued and increased 
collaboration both bilaterally and through organizations other than NATO”, the Committee 
recommended that such collaboration be strengthened by consultation on economic issues of 
special interest to the Alliance.
98
 It was pointed out, however, that NATO members should not 
act as a bloc in other organizations, nor should NATO itself establish formal relations with 
any other organization.
99
  
In terms of resolving conflicting economic policies within the Alliance, the Committee 
suggested that, similar to political conflicts, the Secretary General and the individual members 
should be allowed to raise issues for discussion, with the only qualification being that the 
issue was not being handled effectively in another forum. The good offices procedure should 
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be available in economic matters as in political matters.
100
 To further facilitate consultation 
and resolution of disputes, the Committee advised the Council to establish a Committee of 
Economic Advisers, tasked with preliminary discussion of matters to be brought before the 
Council.
101
  
The final recommendation in the section on economic cooperation regarded scientific and 
technical cooperation. It was noted that this is an area of particular importance to NATO, and 
indeed that progress in this field was “crucial to the future of the Atlantic Community”.102 The 
Committee therefore recommended that a conference be convened to foster cooperation in 
recruitment and training of scientists, engineers and technicians, interchange of experience 
between these between member countries, and to propose specific measures for future 
cooperation in this field.
103
 
After the two substantial sections on political and economic cooperation there followed two 
shorter sections on cooperation in the cultural and information fields. The Committee 
suggested certain general principles to further cultural cooperation, including support for 
private initiatives, giving priority to joint NATO projects that foster a sense of community and 
promoting transatlantic contacts. It was also pointed out that “there should be a realistic 
appreciation of the financial implications of cultural projects”.104 The specific 
recommendations for projects to further cultural cooperation included arrangements for 
NATO courses and seminars for teachers, creating university chairs of Atlantic studies, 
government-sponsored programmes for the exchange of persons and establishing special 
NATO awards for students. It was also recommended that NATO cooperate more closely 
with youth organizations, and that travel restrictions be revised, with regards to both civilian 
and military personnel. With regards to financing, it was stated that projects that have a 
common benefit should be commonly financed.
105
  
The section on cooperation in the information field mainly focused on the importance of 
keeping the public in the individual member nations informed, both of NATO‟s aspirations 
and of NATO‟s achievements. However, it was pointed out that this was a task for the 
individual national information services, but it was recommended that NATO should assist 
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the individual governments in this work. The Committee specifically recommended the 
designation of an officer from each national information service to be responsible for 
dissemination of NATO information material, that governments should submit their 
information programmes to NATO review and discussion and that NATO should provide the 
national services with special studies on matters of common interest.
106
  
The final section of the report concerned the organization and functions of NATO. The 
Committee found that no structural changes were needed in the organization of NATO. The 
report states that the machinery was present; what was needed was the will to use it. However, 
certain improvements in terms of procedures and functioning were recommended. First, to 
allow for more discussion and consultation, more time should be allowed for Ministerial 
Meetings. It was also suggested that meetings of Foreign Ministers should be held whenever 
they were required, and occasionally at other locations than NATO Headquarters. In addition, 
ministers could more frequently attend regular Council meetings, and it was recommended 
that in order to strengthen links between the Council and the individual member governments, 
specially designated officers or the permanent heads of foreign ministries might also attend 
Council meetings. The Committee also made recommendations to strengthen and enhance the 
role of the Secretary General and the International staff. To enable this it was suggested, in 
addition to recommendations made in previous sections of the report, that the Secretary 
General chair the Ministerial Meetings of the Council.  
 
1.4.2 The December Ministerial Meeting 
It might have been expected that the discussion of the report at the December Ministerial 
Meeting would revolve mainly around the two most substantial sections of the report, namely 
political and economic cooperation. However, this would not be the case. The discussion of 
the report hardly touched upon economic cooperation at all. Much of the discussion revolved 
around the section on political cooperation, but there was little disagreement around the 
recommendations made in the report. Far from protesting that the Committee went too far in 
their recommendations, many of the Foreign Ministers stated that they felt the report did not 
go far enough.  
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The discussion was opened by Martino, who was acting chairman of the meeting, and had 
functioned as Chairman of the Committee of Three. He referred initially to the altered 
international situation, saying that the Alliance was weakened by internal dispute, while at the 
same time events in Hungary had given cause to question the Soviet doctrine of peaceful 
coexistence. Lange continued the discussion, stating that, at the very least, the three major 
members should be able to coordinate their policies, in spite of differences “with regard to 
power and responsibilities”.107 The initial comments from the Committee members were 
ended by Pearson, who reiterated Lange‟s point concerning the three major members.  
The discussion continued with numerous reaffirmations of the need for political consultation 
and cooperation, with few reservations, as long as approval of the report by the Council did 
not entail any other obligations for the member governments but to agree in principle.  
Secretary Dulles stated that the US supported extending political cooperation, but felt the 
need to note some reservations, mainly concerning language and the limitations placed on 
consultation by differing constitutional processes in policy formation.
108
 The only objection of 
any consequence was voiced by the French Foreign Minister Pineau, who maintained that it 
should be the Council, not the Secretary General that should have the power to nominate 
Permanent Representatives in connection with good offices procedures. However, he did not 
insist that this point in the report needed to be changed.
109
  
The rest of the discussion surrounding the report of the Committee of Three revolved around 
whether or not the report should be published. Lange commented on this in his initial remarks 
on the report, stating that it was not the intention of the Committee to publish the letter of 
transmittal, which contained certain “internal considerations”, but that the report itself should 
be made public “if only because of wide spread publicity which has built up expectation and 
because of misunderstanding and misinterpretation which would ensue from non-
publication”.110 Pearson also commented on this question, saying that he hoped the report 
could be published in order to give people a better understanding of NATO‟s ideals and 
aims.
111
 Of those opposing publication, France was most vehement. Pineau declared that if the 
report was to be publicized, the French would require certain amendments “in addition to 
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those required to permit their approval”.112 The French objections primarily concerned 
language that they felt implied criticism of French and British actions in the Middle East.
113
 It 
was decided to postpone further discussion until the next day. In the meantime the Committee 
would consult with Pineau on possible alterations which would address the French grievances. 
The next day, Martino presented proposals on changes that would allow for publication. It 
was suggested that the paragraph implying criticism of Franco-British action in the Middle 
East be changed, and that several paragraphs concerning the establishment of a Committee of 
Economic Advisers and cultural cooperation be transferred to a confidential covering letter. 
Also, the French had suggested omitting the whole section dealing with the organization and 
functioning of NATO. Except for a paragraph concerning security, the Committee proposed 
publishing this section. These suggestions were accepted by Pineau, though he still insisted 
that the report be published only if the resolution to be passed simply noted the report, 
approving only the conclusions. The report would be published as a report of the three 
ministers rather than of the Council.
114
 
The Suez Crisis did indeed cast its shadow over the December ministerial session of the NAC, 
but in relation to the report of the Committee of Three and the discussions surrounding it, 
Suez did not have a negative impact. On the contrary, it must be said that the tense mood of 
the meeting and the focus that was placed on repairing the transatlantic relationship after Suez 
had a positive effect. In the wake of the Suez Crisis, it was impossible for the NATO 
members not to approve of the Committee‟s conclusions; such a refusal would have created a 
politically untenable situation that surely would have torn the Alliance apart. The French and 
British could complain about the language contained in the report and insisted on changes 
before publication, but not obstruct the acceptance by the NAC of the conclusions of the 
Committee.  
Despite several attempts at studying ways of implementing Article 2 and extending 
cooperation in NATO to non-military fields, the perceived new face of the Soviet threat that 
was evident to the NATO governments in 1956 occasioned another try. The impression that 
the military threat from the Soviet Bloc was lessened, only to be replaced by threats of 
economic penetration of the underdeveloped world and political penetration of the West set 
the tone for the endeavours of the Three Wise Men. In this changed international climate, 
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events in the Middle East would make the Committee‟s work harder yet. At times the 
Committee members would even contemplate abandoning their task. The end result was a 
report whose conclusions were accepted only with the reservation that they be regarded as 
guiding principles rather than a strict framework.  
Norway was, through the participation of Foreign Minister Lange, a central actor in the work 
of the Committee of Three. As a small state in an Alliance with a superpower, Norway might 
be seen to have had an interest in extending cooperation as much as possible, as it would 
stand to gain a disproportionate amount of influence. On the other hand, there was always the 
danger that Norway would see itself involved in issues in which it had little interest, and 
nothing to gain. Some issues might even have negative repercussions, particularly on public 
opinion. The next chapter focuses on the Norwegian position on non-military cooperation in 
NATO and what considerations lay behind it.  
  
25 
 
Chapter Two- The Norwegian Position on Non-Military 
Cooperation 
 
The Norwegian position on non-military cooperation was developed through a cooperative 
effort. The reply to the NATO questionnaire was fashioned by the Foreign Ministry with input 
from several other Ministries, and the matter was discussed in depth at Cabinet level at 
several Cabinet meetings as well as in the Security Policy Commission. In addition, the work 
of the Committee of Three was discussed with the parliamentary opposition in the Storting‟s 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs.  
In developing the Norwegian position the Norwegian Government faced many dilemmas. As 
a small state in an alliance with one of the world‟s two superpowers, an extension of political 
consultation in NATO carried with it the prospect of an increase in the influence Norway 
could bring to bear on the international situation. At the same time, however, there existed the 
possibility that Norway would be forced to share responsibility for decisions that could 
adversely affect public opinion. Economic cooperation could offer opportunities for 
coordination of policy and resolving inter-member disputes in economic matters. But it could 
also demand extending financial aid to countries and regions both inside and outside the 
NATO area. Cultural cooperation had the potential of strengthening the unity of the Alliance, 
but joint action in this field also had financial implications. And extending cooperation in the 
field of information could result in the NATO Information Service being transformed into a 
propaganda institution, which might not sit well with the Norwegian public.  
The general impetus behind the Norwegian wish to extend non-military cooperation was 
partly, as it was in many NATO capitals, the perception of a change in Soviet tactics. This 
was, as previously mentioned, one of the main reasons behind the establishment of the 
Committee of Three at the May 1956 Ministerial Meeting of the NAC. It was felt in the 
Foreign Ministry that it was important to remain united in meeting Soviet advances in the 
political and economic fields. Norway saw these advances as aiming at creating division 
among the Western allies, and discrediting them in the eyes of the world.
115
 This view of the 
aims of Soviet policy formed the background for the development of the Norwegian position, 
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but the reasoning behind the specific answers to the NATO questionnaire was more complex 
and varied.  
This chapter will detail and analyse the Norwegian position on non-military cooperation, 
using the Norwegian reply to the Committee‟s questionnaire as a point of departure. The reply 
is divided into sections on political, economic, cultural, informational and organizational 
questions. This chapter will therefore be divided into corresponding sections containing a 
summary and an analysis of the Norwegian position. 
 
2.1 Political Cooperation 
The main focus of the Norwegian position on non-military cooperation in NATO was on 
political consultation. The Norwegian reply was based on the view that an extension of 
political consultation was necessary in order to prevent conditions detrimental to the unity and 
strength of the Alliance through unilateral and uncoordinated action. In addition to adversely 
affecting the unity of the Alliance, the Norwegian Government felt that such action also 
exposed NATO to Soviet propaganda, both at home and internationally.
116
  
In order to avoid situations that would weaken the unity and strength of the Alliance, Norway 
encouraged informal exchanges of information, and espoused efforts to arrive at “common 
appreciations ... with regard to matters of common concern” in a wide range of matters.117 The 
Norwegian view of the appropriate scope of consultation reflected the view that the 
commitments of NATO were limited to a definite geographical area, and that it was not 
desirable to extend these commitments beyond this area. The Norwegian reply stated that the 
general aims set out in the Treaty gave a very wide scope of consultation. However, it was 
thought that particular focus should be placed on matters that related to the external threat to 
the NATO area, such as Soviet policy in general, the German question and disarmament. 
These matters were to be made the subject of regular studies and discussions aiming at a high 
degree of coordination of policies.
118
  
While the Norwegian reply recognised that a wide scope of consultation was possible, the 
Norwegian Government admitted that there were certain limitations. First of all, it was 
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pointed out that any general consensus reached through discussions in the Council should not 
be binding, due to the necessity in many member countries of parliamentary sanction before 
agreement could be reached. A second limiting factor was that certain members were 
recognised as having “specific responsibilities and possibilities of action not shared by other 
members”.119 In addition to these limitations, Norway pointed to the need to avoid duplicating 
the work being satisfactorily done in other organizations.
120
 As for developing regulations for 
determining what categories of questions should be the subject of consultation, the Norwegian 
position was that devising rigid rules was not desirable, as it might reduce the interest of 
members to use NATO as a forum for consultation at all, and could lead to “unfortunate and 
useless discussions of procedural questions”.121 
The second area of focus of the Norwegian reply to the political section of the questionnaire 
was inter-member disputes. The negative view towards rigid and definite procedures carried 
over to the issue of conciliation in inter-member disputes. With regard to situations of 
disputes between members it was the Norwegian view that it was of great importance to 
handle such disputes within the Alliance. It was felt that public opinion expected action in 
such instances, and that bringing up inter-member disputes in other organizations could be 
harmful to the unity of NATO. In the Norwegian view the two most evident questions of 
importance to NATO in this regard were Cyprus and Iceland. While discouraging the idea of 
definite procedures for handling inter-member disputes, the Norwegian position was that the 
Council should have the right to investigate “any inter-member dispute in order to determine 
whether the continuance of the dispute is likely to endanger the security or weaken the unity 
of the Alliance”, and that the Secretary General or any Member Government should have the 
right to bring any dispute to the Council.
122
 
The final area of focus in the political section of the Norwegian reply concerned 
parliamentary associations. It was the Norwegian view that it was important to create interest 
and understanding of NATO in the members‟ parliamentary bodies in order to obtain a high 
degree of parliamentary backing. In this regard it was felt that visits of parliamentary 
committees to NATO headquarters and to other member countries was a useful tool. In 
particular, establishing closer contact between parliamentarians on the two sides of the 
                                                 
119
 UD, Dz 2002, 33.2/61-Tremannskomitéen, Bind III,”Norway‟s Reply to the Committee of Three-
Questionnaire”. 
120
 Ibid. 
121
 Ibid. 
122
 Ibid. 
28 
 
Atlantic was seen as important. In this field it was the Norwegian view that the NATO 
parliamentary conferences played a significant role, and that these should be made a regular 
part of NATO activity. Giving the parliamentary conferences a consultative status, however, 
was not desirable. It was thought that this could have negative effects on political 
consultation.  
Political consultation was the central theme of the Norwegian position on extending political 
cooperation in NATO. This had its background in the French decision to transfer two 
divisions of its troops that were earmarked for use by NATO to Algeria. The Norwegian 
Government resented the lack of consultation on the matter, and that the Council was 
presented with what it saw as a French fait accompli.
123
 However, while resentment towards 
French unilateralism was an immediate and specific factor in the Norwegian wishes for more 
political consultation, there was also a more general feeling that developing the non-military 
aspect of NATO was essential to the continued existence of NATO. Bureau Chief Georg 
Kristiansen in the Foreign Ministry‟s 3rd Political Office presented the view that while the 
basic function of NATO was collective defence, this function could not be fulfilled without a 
sense of community that could not be created by military cooperation alone. Rather, genuine 
political and economic cooperation was necessary in order to eliminate the possibility of 
internal conflict.
124
 Similar sentiments could be found throughout the upper echelons of the 
Norwegian Foreign Service. In the Foreign Ministry, Director General of the Political 
Department in the Foreign Ministry Frithjof Jacobsen stated that the future of NATO 
depended on the creation of genuinely effective political consultation machinery in NATO.
125
 
Another official that espoused the same view was Hans Engen, the Norwegian Permanent 
Representative to the UN. In his view, since the NATO member countries did not constitute a 
homogenous political group, extending cooperation outside military matters could result in 
the Alliance being torn apart by “centrifugal forces”. However, Engen thought it likely that 
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these forces would arise in any event, and that extending political cooperation might represent 
the best means of dealing with them.
126
  
The idea that NATO did not constitute a homogenous political group was present in Oslo as 
well. According to Bureau Chief Kristiansen, the reason behind much of the perceived 
malaise was that there was no real basis for common policies among the NATO members. In 
fact, Kristiansen doubted whether there was any common interest to speak of outside common 
defence. In his opinion, the long term goal of the Alliance had to be to provide a better 
foundation for common policies, through more sharing of information between members and 
closer economic and cultural cooperation.
127
  
Thus the Norwegian position on non-military cooperation was in many ways positive. 
However, there were definite limits to how far the Norwegian Government was willing to go, 
and at all levels there was apprehension as to what an extension of political cooperation could 
entail. First of all, Norway was unwilling to take any steps that would require relinquishing 
sovereignty. It was clearly stated that Norway had, as did the larger powers in the Alliance, 
objections to any such developments.
128
 Any movement towards a supranational approach 
was unacceptable, as was also pointed out with regard to the role of national parliaments. 
Parliamentary cooperation such as that which took place through the Council of Europe was 
not seen as a profitable way forward.
129
 The question of sovereignty did not only relate to 
developing common policies through political consultation and parliamentary cooperation, 
but also to solving inter-member disputes. However, here the position was the opposite. If 
conciliation in inter-member disputes was to be possible at all, member countries could not be 
allowed to refuse to let disputes be discussed in NATO. In this regard, however, it was seen as 
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necessary and acceptable, and it was thought that most of the NATO members would agree to 
this.
130
  
Beyond the problems extended political cooperation presented with regard to sovereignty, 
there was also widespread apprehension as to what such an extension would mean. The 
Norwegian Permanent Representative to NATO Jens Boyesen was quite clear in a letter to 
Lange in early April about the risks involved in extending political cooperation. In Boyesen‟s 
opinion, it was just as important to decide what matters it was not desirable to discuss as it 
was to decide what matters were suitable for consultation. With regard to issues that related 
directly to NATO, such as Germany and Soviet policy, Boyesen thought that the degree of 
consultation already present was satisfactory. In extending consultation to matters that, 
although important to security, lay outside of the Treaty area Boyesen strongly advised 
caution. Referring specifically to North Africa and the Middle East, Boyesen points out that if 
a matter has been the subject of proper consultation based on a sufficient amount of factual 
information, it would be difficult to reject attempts at developing a common policy. The end 
result of such discussions, he maintained, would always tend to be closer to the original intent 
of whichever member had the immediate responsibility and was best informed of the 
situation. Further, he stated that in a situation in which Norway could no longer complain 
about the treatment of an issue, and in which all the NATO members attempted to arrive at a 
common policy, one could not expect that any deviating views held by one or a few members 
would have an impact on the rest. Boyesen therefore advised that the aim of consultation 
should be to attain the fullest possible information on an issue, to be afforded the opportunity 
to question and comment, but not to develop common policies on matters for which Norway 
did not have any responsibility, nor had the ability to take responsibility for.
131
 
The apparent negativity that underlies the Norwegian position on political cooperation stands 
in harsh contrast to the positive attitude that was the conveyed in public. The Norwegian 
Government spoke warmly of the need for increased political cooperation and closer 
consultation within the Alliance, while at the same time clearly recognizing that the 
importance of maintaining sovereignty trumped the possible advantages of closer cooperation 
within the Alliance. In addition to this, the realization of what extensive consultation in the 
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NAC might entail politically in terms of shared responsibility for the policies of its allies 
further tempered the attitude towards political cooperation in the Norwegian Government. 
 
2.2 Economic Cooperation 
The Norwegian reply to the section of the NATO questionnaire regarding economic questions 
had three main areas of focus. The first area was the desirability of utilising already existing 
organizations such as the OEEC, IMF and GATT. The Norwegian reply stated that it was 
necessary to take full advantage of the opportunities for cooperation that these organizations 
already presented. The OEEC in particular is seen as an important economic body, despite the 
fact that the US and Canada only participated as associated members. In fact, it was the 
Norwegian view that this arrangement was adequate, and that no change in the relationship of 
the US and Canada vis-à-vis the OEEC was necessary.  
While Norway was clear in its view on the necessity of utilising existing organizations, the 
possibility of using the consultative machinery of the NAC to discuss matters that mainly 
concerned other international bodies was also recognized as offering benefits. This pertained 
particularly to matters that had not received satisfactory attention or solution elsewhere, where 
it was seen as desirable to avoid conflicting views and with regard to economic questions with 
wider political and strategic implications. In cases involving such matters the Norwegian 
position was that it was important to use NATO‟s consultative machinery, not necessarily to 
develop common policies, but at least to reach agreement on principles.  
Thus the basic assumption was that economic questions were best left to existing 
organizations, unless specific circumstances justified using the consultative machinery in 
NATO. This also applied to resolving conflicts between the economic policies of NATO 
members. While it was thought that inter-member disputes in political questions were best 
handled within NATO, rather than at the UN, in economic disputes it was thought that 
conflict resolution was best handled by the OEEC.
132
    
The second area of focus in the Norwegian reply was the question of utilising NATO to 
extend financial aid to areas both inside and outside of the Treaty area. Regarding the 
possibility of extending aid to underdeveloped areas within NATO, the Norwegian attitude 
                                                 
132
 UD, Dz 2002, 33.2/61-Tremannskomitéen, Bind III,”Norway‟s Reply to the Committee of Three-
Questionnaire”. 
32 
 
was negative. It was felt that it would be more practical to handle such tasks by other 
organizations more specialized in the field. However, in answer to the question of developing 
public works for civilian use within NATO through common efforts, the attitude was more 
positive. It was thought that such works might be beneficial to military and civil emergency 
planning, and that it would be a natural field for NATO to engage in. In fact, NATO might 
have “particular qualifications” due to experience drawn from the military infrastructure 
programme.
133
 In addition, efforts in this field were thought to have an appeal to public 
opinion. However, while Norway was clearly positive to efforts in this field, it was also stated 
that it would be necessary to thoroughly explore possible financial or organizational problems 
that might arise.
134
  
The negative view regarding aid to underdeveloped areas within the Alliance was based on 
the reasoning that in any kind of aid programme to underdeveloped areas within the NATO 
area, due to lower living standards in large parts of Southern Europe Norway would be a net 
contributor rather than a net receiver.
135
 In any case, the Foreign Ministry was of the opinion 
that any initiative in this area would have to come from the US if it was to have any merit.
136
 
However, although Norway was sceptical to a NATO financed internal aid programme, there 
was a positive attitude towards a commonly financed programme for developing public works 
for civilian use. The stated reason for supporting such a programme referred to the positive 
effect this would have on public opinion. On the other hand the Norwegian reply also 
mentions the experience drawn from the military infrastructure programme. With the great 
benefits Norway had reaped through the military infrastructure programme, it is perhaps not 
surprising that the prospect of a similar programme in public works was welcomed. 
Concerning whether to extend aid through NATO to underdeveloped areas outside of the 
Treaty area, this was seen as impractical and difficult due to political considerations, and it 
was felt that the existing agencies operating in this field were satisfactorily organized. Instead, 
it was thought that it would be more appropriate to stimulate UN activities in this field, for 
example by strengthening the economic basis of specialized UN agencies such as the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In particular, the Norwegian 
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Government suggested that the NATO members individually support the Special United 
Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED). It was pointed out that this UN project 
was considered by a number of politically important underdeveloped countries to be of great 
importance.  
While it was the Norwegian position that NATO was not a suitable organization for 
channelling aid, it was nevertheless felt that it would be useful if NATO members consulted 
within NATO on the basic policies to be followed in this field. In addition, it was the 
Norwegian attitude that coordinating individual policies regarding steps taken individually 
within normal trade relations with underdeveloped countries was essential, as such individual 
actions could contribute to creating a favourable political climate for Western countries in 
general. Aid given through the UN would not have the same “PR-value”.137 It was recognized 
that multilateral efforts at extending aid would have a greater political effect than bilateral 
efforts, but at the same time it was realized that many countries would be apprehensive about 
aid coming from an organization which counted as its members several colonial powers.
138
 
The question of which method of extending aid would bring the greatest political benefits was 
clearly an important one. In the Norwegian view the best means of reaping maximum political 
advantage was through the UN, particularly the proposed SUNFED.
139
  
In relation to the question of aid to underdeveloped areas, the Norwegian Government based 
its view on the assumption that the changed international situation warranted an effort in this 
field. It was agreed that one should raise the issue in the NAC as to whether NATO members 
could to a certain degree decrease defence spending on the background of lessened 
international tension, and make the funds saved available to underdeveloped countries 
through the UN.
140
 This was, however, not an uncontroversial idea. Boyesen advised against 
it, stating that as Norway already had a smaller defence burden than many of its allies, such a 
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suggestion might seem as “window dressing” for a lack of willingness to contribute to the 
common defence effort.
141
 
The final area of focus in the Norwegian reply concerned economic policy vis-à-vis the Soviet 
Bloc. It was the Norwegian view that some issues of this kind were of great importance, and 
that close cooperation within NATO on these matters would be prudent. Such cooperation 
should not be limited to countering or neutralising Soviet commercial practices. Rather, it was 
important to discuss the basic economic policies to be followed in a broad sense. In spite of 
this clear view of the necessity of close coordination of policy, the Norwegian Government 
recognized certain pitfalls in this field. It was stated that any recourse to practices that were 
out of line with generally recognized commercial rules would not be beneficial. Also, it was 
realized that the Communist economic system made it comparatively easy for the Soviet Bloc 
to respond effectively to such competition.    
The Norwegian position on economic cooperation in NATO was closely linked to the position 
on political cooperation. Much of the same reasoning that lay behind the conclusion that 
extending political consultation was necessary in order to create a better foundation for 
common policy, also applied to economic cooperation. Strengthening the unity of the Alliance 
by limiting the possibilities of conflict in economic matters was seen as necessary to 
strengthen the basis for collective defence.
142
  
However, the Norwegian reply clearly stated that such cooperation should only take place in 
NATO if warranted by special circumstances. There were several reasons behind this 
reluctance to make use of the consultative machinery of the NAC in economic matters. First, 
there was the realization that the NATO members did not comprise a homogenous group in 
terms of economic policies.
143
 Second, there were fears that extending economic cooperation 
in NATO would be an obstacle in the ongoing work towards the development of a Nordic 
common market, as it might serve to alienate Sweden.
144
 Finally, there was the basic feeling 
that the organizations that already existed on the economic side functioned satisfactorily. 
While political issues had to be handled within the Alliance, particularly inter-member 
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disputes, economic issues could safely be handled in the OEEC because of its limited 
membership. Unlike at the UN, NATO members were not directly exposed to criticism from 
the Soviet Bloc.  
 
2.3 Cultural and Informational Cooperation  
The Norwegian position on cultural cooperation was mainly focused on fostering closer ties 
between the member countries and on educational activities. In terms of education the 
position was divided between general activities and the more specific question of cooperation 
in training scientists and technicians. Regarding measures to engender closer ties between 
members, the focus was on exchanges of both civilian and military personnel, as well as 
coordinating the work of youth organizations.  
In general the Norwegian position on cultural cooperation had a clear focus on the necessity 
of coordinating efforts in the field with other organizations where the NATO members were 
represented. In particular, Norway desired a more active approach by the NATO members to 
participation in the activities of UNESCO. Furthermore, Norway saw a need for improving 
coordination and cooperation between the foreign services of the members and youth 
organizations. The Communist youth organizations in Eastern Europe, it was stated in the 
Norwegian reply, were organized to work in close cooperation with each other and the foreign 
services of their respective countries. In the West, however, there were several organizations 
working in what was considered an uncoordinated fashion. While not suggesting that NATO 
itself should coordinate the work done by these organizations, the Norwegian reply suggested 
that NATO address this situation and consider what steps, if any, should be taken to 
encourage closer cooperation between the various organizations. To aid in this it was also 
suggested to strengthen the NATO Secretariat by creating a post for an official to study and 
report on this problem, as well as serve as a liaison between NATO and the youth 
organizations. In addition, it was considered that the NATO Youth Conference that had been 
arranged in July 1956 had been successful and should be repeated.
145
  
Concerning educational activities it was felt that a rise in the general level of education in the 
NATO countries was desirable. At the same time, however, it was felt that NATO was not a 
suitable organization for undertaking educational activities “in the proper sense of the 
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word”.146 Rather, it was stated that NATO‟s role should be to initiate, encourage and support 
activities in this field, while the responsibility for action should rest with the individual 
governments. 
147
  
Regarding training of scientists and technicians, on the other hand, the Norwegian position 
was clear. This field was considered to be of the greatest importance and one in which NATO 
could play an important role. In fact, the Norwegian reply goes so far as to suggest that certain 
projects in this field might be considered as important as commonly financed projects in the 
military field, and particular focus was placed on the possibility of joint financing of projects 
in this field. There was also a feeling of urgency in the Norwegian reply, suggesting that 
“specially (sic) urgent tasks” be attempted.148 It was also suggested that it might be useful to 
initiate a long-term programme in this field.
149
  
The Norwegian reply presented exchanges of personnel as a profitable means of fostering 
closer ties between the member countries. The arrangement of summer schools for students 
already taking place on a bilateral basis was considered successful, and it was suggested that 
similar exchanges be considered for other groups. Similarly, a planned project for visiting 
professorships at institutions in the NATO countries was considered to be of interest in this 
field. In addition, the Norwegian reply considered that exchanges of service personnel on 
leave might be beneficial in creating stronger ties between the member countries by creating 
mutual interest and understanding amongst the younger generation. However, it was felt that 
arranging exchanges of personnel on a multilateral basis would possibly raise considerable 
administrative and financial problems, and that members therefore should be encouraged to 
arrange such exchanges on a bilateral basis.
150
  
The idea of strengthening unity through increased understanding was also a factor in the 
Norwegian position on cooperation in the information field. However, the Norwegian reply 
expressed several reservations in terms of the scope of cooperation. It was stated that the 
NATO Information Service (NIS) should primarily focus on purely factual information. 
Further, it was the Norwegian opinion that this information should be of a positive character, 
in that it should explain what NATO was for, rather than what NATO was against. Nor did 
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the Norwegian reply show any enthusiasm for giving the NIS any responsibility for 
coordinating a centralized propaganda aimed at the Soviet Bloc, or that it should act as a 
counterpropaganda institution. However, Norway was not adverse to an arrangement where 
the NIS could act as a clearing-house for ideas and material. In relation to this, Norway also 
advocated establishing close ties between the NIS and the national information services. To 
this end it was suggested that national information officers could participate more frequently 
on the Information Committee, and that it might be necessary to strengthen both the national 
services as well as the NIS.
151
  
Another means of fostering understanding that the Norwegian reply suggested was to 
continue and extend the practice of arranging tours of NATO countries for journalists, 
lecturers and teachers. It was considered of great importance to keep the public sympathetic to 
and informed of the activities of the Alliance, and as with exchanges of civilian and military 
personnel, such tours were considered to be a fruitful means of achieving this. On the other 
hand, it was recognized that while it was desirable to keep the public informed, the necessity 
for confidentiality, particularly in regard to political consultation, presented a dilemma. It 
was, however, not considered advisable to adopt a general policy in this question. Rather, 
such cases would have to be considered on a case by case basis.  
The background for the Norwegian position on cultural and informational cooperation was 
that such cooperation was a means of strengthening the foundation for cooperation in the 
military and political fields. An important aspect in this regard was the need to bolster public 
support. The Foreign Ministry was of the opinion that among the different fields of non-
military cooperation, the cultural field was the field which the public considered to be most 
civilian, and by engaging in this area NATO would be assured stronger support in public 
opinion.
152
 Educational activities could also be justified on these grounds. A cooperative 
effort in training scientists and technicians was considered to demonstrate NATO‟s 
competence and capacity in the non-military field, which would also be beneficial in 
strengthening public support
153
 In the informational field, as well, there was a clear focus on 
ensuring that the Alliance had public support.  
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This possibility for demonstrating NATO‟s capacity was not the only reason for suggesting 
common efforts in training scientists and technicians, nor was it the main reason. There was a 
feeling in the Foreign Ministry that the West was lagging behind in this field compared to the 
Soviet Bloc, and that there was a technician gap between East and West.
154
 The fear that the 
West was falling behind in an important field was shared by the Ministry of Defence.
155
  
As in the other fields of non-military cooperation, the Norwegian Government recognized that 
there were obstacles and pitfalls. In terms of what could be achieved in the cultural field, 
Lange was of the opinion that it was paramount that proponents of cooperation in this field 
avoid alarming the US, particularly with regard to suggesting joint financing of projects.
156
 
Another tendency that is apparent throughout the Norwegian reply is the desire to avoid 
duplicating the work of other organizations. In relation to cultural cooperation, it was felt that 
it would be beneficial if all the NATO members would support the work of UNESCO. At the 
same time, Lange warned against encroaching on UNESCO‟s field of purpose.157 
 
2.4 Organizational Changes 
To the extent that the Norwegian Government advocated any organizational changes, it was 
strictly to facilitate political consultation. In the Norwegian view, extending cooperation in 
non-military fields did not create the need for changes to the structure of the organization. 
There was also the question of whether to establish the position of NATO as a regional 
organization in the terms of Chapter 8 of the UN Charter. The Norwegian Government clearly 
stated that this was not considered either necessary or desirable.  
To further facilitate political consultation, and thus consultation on certain economic matters, 
the Norwegian reply contained some suggestions to this end. First of all, the Norwegian reply 
stressed that the member Governments should recognize fully that the NAC in permanent 
session had the same authority as the NAC in ministerial session. In relation to this, it was 
also pointed out that it was viewed as essential that the members give a high priority to their 
representation on the NAC, and that an effort be made to ensure the closest possible link 
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between Governments and their representatives. Second, the Norwegian reply suggested that 
the NAC should consider the possibilities of delegating its powers of decision in certain fields 
to the respective committees, leaving more time for discussions of political problems. In 
addition, it was stressed that more attention needed to be given to preparation of matters 
placed on the agenda of the Council. In relation to preparation of matters for discussion, the 
Norwegian reply suggested that consideration be given to whether the Working Group on 
Trends and Implications of Soviet Foreign Policy should be made a permanent institution, and 
the scope of its work extended to cover all aspects of Soviet policies.
158
 
In relation to strengthening the Council in permanent session, it was also considered whether 
it was necessary to strengthen the role of the Secretary General. In the Norwegian view this 
was not deemed necessary, as it was considered that the Secretary General already had 
sufficient powers to fulfil his role with regard to political consultation. However, it was 
suggested that the Council reaffirm the authority given to the Secretary General at the Lisbon 
ministerial session of the NAC, in particular his right to initiate matters for Council action. 
The Norwegian view on the need for organizational changes was of course based on the 
Norwegian position on extending cooperation in the different non-military fields. 
Strengthening the NAC in permanent session as well as the machinery for political 
consultation was in line with the clear Norwegian focus on political cooperation. Similarly, 
reaffirming the role of the Secretary General was considered necessary to ensure a wide scope 
of political consultation. In addition, by underlining the right of the Secretary General to 
initiate matters for Council action, members would not be able to keep inter-member disputes 
off the agenda in the NAC.  
The clearly negative view on establishing NATO as a regional organization under the UN had 
to do with the fact that Chapter 8 of the UN Charter states that regional organizations created 
under Article 53 of the Charter were placed under the authority of the Security Council, a 
prospect that was unacceptable to the Norwegian Government, despite their continuously 
strong support for the UN.  
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2.5 Conclusions 
The Norwegian position on non-military cooperation had a clear and distinct focus on 
political consultation. Economic cooperation was only seen as desirable in terms of 
consultation, and even then only under certain conditions, such as if the matter was not being 
handled in a satisfactory manner elsewhere, or it was of importance to avoid conflicting views 
in other forums. Questions of strategic importance were also considered as suitable for 
discussion in the NAC, as was the matter of Soviet economic policy. In the cultural and 
informational fields NATO was afforded a limited role, with focus on national responsibilities 
with regards to information and propaganda/counterpropaganda, and focus on support for 
external initiatives.  
Another recurring trend in the Norwegian reply was the importance of avoiding duplicating 
the work of other organizations. In the economic field the OEEC was considered as the most 
effective means of cooperation, in part due to its limited membership. In the cultural field 
primary support would be given to the work of UNESCO. In the political field, however, 
there was a recognized need for discussing political questions within the organization before 
they were handled elsewhere. Still, it was maintained that the NATO members should not 
give the appearance of acting as a Bloc in the UN.  
Thus the Norwegian position on non-military cooperation was developed balancing the desire 
for closer cooperation with the possible negative effects such cooperation could have for 
Norwegian sovereignty, freedom of action and public opinion. The US on the other hand, 
performed a balancing act of its own in developing its position on non-military cooperation. 
The next chapter will detail this US position and the considerations that lay behind it.  
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Chapter Three- The US Position on Non-Military Cooperation 
 
Where the Norwegian position was developed through close cooperation between the Foreign 
and Defence Ministries, as well as with the political opposition, the development of the US 
position was largely handled by the State Department. While there did exist some cooperation 
with Congress, mainly through the integral participation of Senator George, the US position 
was developed more independently than was the case in Norway. This is not to say, however, 
that Congress was put on the sideline.  
The Norwegian position on non-military cooperation was worked out taking into account the 
conflicting realities of being a small state in an alliance with a superpower. While, as we have 
seen, increased non-military cooperation might afford Norway an amount of influence out of 
proportion to its size, there was also an inherent danger of having to share responsibility for 
decisions that were controversial to the public, and which the Norwegian government did not 
necessarily have the resources to examine fully. The US position, on the other hand, was a 
balancing act which had to take into account other factors. 
This chapter will detail and analyse the US position on non-military cooperation, using the US 
reply to the Committee‟s questionnaire as a point of departure. The US reply is divided into 
sections on political, economic, cultural, informational and organizational questions. This 
chapter will therefore be divided into corresponding sections containing a summary of the US 
position and an analysis.  
 
3.1  Political Cooperation 
In addressing the political questions in the questionnaire, the US reply focused on continuing 
to build on the existing working relationship in the NAC, rather than on creating new 
organizations or institutions. This view of the sufficiency of the current mechanisms was a 
recurring theme in the US position, and also applied to the question of the adequacy of the 
Treaty itself. There was, according to the US position, no need for a new Treaty or any 
amendments to the original Treaty.
159
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In particular, the US reply was sceptical of the necessity or practicality of taking a 
supranational approach in developing the Alliance. The US unwillingness to relinquish 
sovereignty to any kind of supranational cooperative entity was admitted in discussions 
surrounding the US attitude towards European integration as early as 1952.
160
 However, it 
should be noted that while the U.S. in 1952 urged European states to relinquish sovereignty 
with regards to integration, this was in a purely European dimension. After the December 
1956 NAC Ministerial Meeting, President Eisenhower asserted that US policy, like the 
policies of any other member government, could not be made in the NAC, due the obvious 
constitutional difficulties that would arise.
161
 Thus the US clearly did not intend to relinquish 
any sovereignty, and it did not expect the other member governments to do so either, within 
the NATO framework.  
Regarding political consultation in the NAC, the US position was mainly positive. It was 
stated that the US was willing to participate in any of the forms of consultations mentioned in 
the questionnaire, although it was also asserted that devising rigid rules concerning 
consultations was not advisable.
162
 The most important need, in the US view, was to improve 
existing arrangements for consultations, in part by supplementing these existing arrangements 
by providing for a new type of periodic consultations to be conducted by high ranking 
officials.
 163
  This new form of consultation is discussed further in the section dealing with 
organizational questions.  
In the opinion of the US, it was not advisable to attempt to develop “hard and fast” 
procedures, but at the same time, all the member governments should have the opportunity to 
inform of and explain their policies, and to request such information from their allies. It was 
recognized that US actions anywhere in the world could be said to have an effect on all the 
NATO members. Therefore, even subjects remote from the direct interest of NATO countries 
should not necessarily be excluded. However, it was Dulles‟ view that the most important 
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issues on which common policies could be developed through political consultation were 
those which had direct consequences for the Alliance, such as Germany and North Africa.
164
 
While the general attitude towards improving and extending the consultation mechanism was 
positive, the US had reservations regarding certain factors. The first reservation was that 
while the US agreed in principle that NATO governments should make every effort to keep 
the Council fully and promptly informed, the US could not in practice assure the Council 
advance information except in rare instances, due to the nature of the US political system. It 
was noted that, in the US, Congress and the public become aware of political developments 
almost as they happen, thus making any advance information difficult at best.
165
 A second 
reservation was that, while the US could agree to the principle that the Council should not be 
requested to adopt resolutions without being afforded the opportunity to consider the matter in 
light of all available information, the US could not agree to refrain from making political 
declarations without adequate prior consultation in the Council, even on issues significantly 
affecting the Alliance. It was pointed out that in the US, as in all the member countries, the 
government is in the end obligated to its own people and parliament. In addition, prior 
consultation could in some cases be precluded by time restraints. However, it was stated that 
the development of a habit of close consultation would, at least in part, alleviate this problem. 
A third reservation made with regards to political consultation was the assertion that the US 
had vital interests in other areas than Western Europe, including other Treaty obligations. It 
was therefore maintained that the main focus of political consultation in NATO should be 
with regard to NATO-area questions. It was at times felt that the Europeans held the view that 
NATO should always be first priority. Dulles stated clearly that the US could not subordinate 
its other Treaty obligations to NATO.
166
 
The US also agreed to the need for additional procedures for dealing with inter-member 
disputes. As with political consultation, it was felt that it was advisable to avoid elaborate and 
formal mechanisms in this field. The primary example of inter-member disputes at the time 
the Committee was preparing its report was the conflict between Greece and Turkey over 
Cyprus. In the course of the autumn of 1956, the Suez Crisis would of course also become a 
source of inter-member tension, if not direct conflict. The US had certain reservations on this 
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issue as well. It was asserted that an important distinction needed to be made: whatever 
procedures were agreed upon would not establish any notion of NATO jurisdiction in inter-
member disputes.
167
 
The final political question that was addressed was the nature of NATO‟s relationship with 
parliamentary associations, and the Parliamentary Conference in particular. While looking 
favourably on the formation of parliamentary associations and the work done by the 
Parliamentary Conference, the US did not feel that it was necessary or desirable to afford 
these groups more formal recognition.  In Dulles‟ opinion, the idea of a closer relationship 
between parliamentarians and the work of NATO presented “interesting and hopeful, but 
somewhat delusive, possibilities”.168 
As we have seen, the US was in general quite positive to extending political cooperation in 
NATO. At the same time, the US had important reservations on virtually every point. There 
are several factors that explain the positive US attitude. Firstly, the US believed that the very 
survival of the Alliance depended on the ability of the member governments to develop 
common policies on several of the central issues facing NATO, such as Germany and North 
Africa. Dulles clearly stated to Pearson that if the NATO governments were unsuccessful in 
developing a common policy on Germany, and in convincing the Germans as to the 
effectiveness of such a policy, Germany could be lost to the Alliance.
169
 Another issue that the 
US thought it crucial to address was the lack of coordination of responses to Soviet initiatives 
towards NATO countries, specifically problems arising from Soviet and Chinese efforts to 
make deals with individual NATO countries to the embarrassment of others.
170
 There was 
also a general worry concerning a perceived new Soviet focus on Scandinavia, Greece and 
Turkey on NATO‟s flanks.171 Also with regard to the Scandinavian NATO members, an 
extension of non-military cooperation in general was seen as a move that would strengthen 
popular support for NATO in these countries, and counteract “strong neutralist currents” in 
these countries.
172
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Another factor in the US support for extending political cooperation, and political 
consultation in particular, was the wish for more opportunities to exchange views on 
contemplated actions of the other member governments. It was Dulles‟ view that the US was 
often placed in the position of having to “underwrite the consequences” of actions that other 
NATO governments had taken without prior consultation. The US wanted an opportunity to 
express its views on actions that would create responsibilities for the US.
173
 Almost 
prophetically, Dulles spoke on this subject in a conversation with Pearson as early as June 
1956, months before the Suez debacle, which although not the first example of this, was 
certainly the most serious. 
The US support for establishing new procedures for dealing with inter-member disputes may 
be explained also by the wish to keep internal disputes out of the UN. By allowing disputes to 
reach the UN, NATO would become susceptible to propaganda from the Soviet Bloc. The 
solution, according to Dulles, was not just to discuss matters in the NAC before discussing 
them at the UN, but discussing them before they reached the UN at all.
174
  
The US reservations had their background in a few central political realities. First, the US 
could not assure that advance information could be given, nor could the US refrain from 
making political declarations without adequate prior consultation. This was due to the nature 
of the US political system, where both Congress and the press are kept thoroughly briefed on 
most political matters. Even if there had been a will to change this system, which there was 
not, it is doubtful whether this would have been at all possible. Second, while NATO held the 
key to many important goals in US foreign policy in Europe, such as German unity and 
countering the Communist threat, Europe was not the only area in which the US had vital 
interests and Treaty obligations. On the contrary, the US had interests and obligations in every 
region of the world, and could not afford to give the impression that NATO was more 
important than other Treaty organizations such as ANZUS and SEATO. Third, the US could 
not agree to establish any procedures for resolving inter-member disputes that involved giving 
NATO any form of jurisdiction. Giving NATO jurisdiction in inter-member disputes would 
entail relinquishing sovereignty, and this is something that the US would not do. It is doubtful 
whether it would have been possible to give NATO jurisdiction in any event at all, as it would 
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have meant amending or altering the North Atlantic Treaty, which would have to be sent to 
Congress for approval, which would be difficult to obtain. Senator George had advised 
against this.
175
 Finally, the opposition to giving more formal recognition to parliamentary 
associations had two reasons. First, there was the unavoidable fact that in an association of 
parliamentarians from the NATO countries, there would be representatives from the 
Communist Parties from several countries, such as France and Italy. This was clearly not 
desirable. Secondly, more formal recognition and closer relationships would bring up the 
question of financing. In the US opinion, such associations should be based on private 
financing. This primacy of private initiative is a recurring theme in the US position on non-
military cooperation.  
Thus it is evident that, as was the case with the Norwegian attitude towards political 
cooperation, the US attitude was similarly tempered by the realization of what closer 
cooperation would entail. Further, it was important for the US to at least give the impression 
that there was balance in its relationship with the various regional arrangements with which it 
was associated. In addition, the prospect of relinquishing sovereignty was as impossible for 
the US as it was for Norway. On the face of it the public US attitude towards closer political 
cooperation was positive, despite the underlying scepticism. This was, as previously 
mentioned, also the case in Norway.  
 
3.2  Economic Cooperation 
The second section of the US reply to the Committee‟s questionnaire concerned economic 
questions. It was pointed out at the outset that continued close cooperation in this field was of 
prime importance in countering the new Soviet economic tactics. The economic questions 
were divided into three general areas: economic cooperation, aid to underdeveloped areas and 
economic policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Bloc. In terms of economic cooperation, the US 
position was that consultation on economic issues should aim at developing common views 
on economic policy, while taking into account the political implications of economic 
decisions. A point was made in this regard that the focus should be on issues rather than 
specific concerns primarily related to national interests.  
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Another facet of economic cooperation that was addressed was conflicts in international 
economic policies. It was stated that attention should be given particularly to economic issues 
that had a bearing on the unity of the Alliance. As with the subject of inter-member disputes, 
it was felt that conflicts in international economic policies between members should be 
handled in NATO. However, here the distinction was made that this was only the case if the 
conflict had an impact on the internal strength of the Alliance, or if progress in resolving the 
conflict made in another organization was too slow. A special point was made here that it was 
important to distinguish between conflicts that arose as a result of the element of competition 
that is inherent in the Western capitalist system and conflicts that arose as a result of 
protectionist policies.  
A recurring theme in the US position that was evident in this section was the adequacy of the 
existing institutions. As was previously stated in the section concerning political questions, 
the US saw no need for new mechanisms, whether in terms of new agencies or organizations, 
closer relations between NATO and existing organizations, or a change in the US status in the 
OEEC. However, while it was felt that any new mechanisms would impair rather than 
improve cooperation, it was asserted that it was desirable to improve informal working 
relationships. 
The second area of focus in the economic section was aid to underdeveloped areas, both 
within and outside of the NATO. With regard to underdeveloped areas within the NATO, the 
US position was that this was better done through other channels than NATO. Similarly, it 
was not felt that it would be useful to give attention to the construction of public works for 
civilian use in a NATO framework. Outside of the NATO area it was stated that NATO had 
an important interest in economic development, and that an exchange of views and 
information with regards to this would be useful. However, it was not felt that NATO was an 
appropriate agency to undertake action in this field.  
The final area of focus was economic policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Bloc. Cooperation between 
NATO members was emphasized in this area. The US saw the need for an exchange of 
information with regard to Soviet commercial practices and their purposes, and it was asserted 
that it was highly important to ensure adequate consultation on questions likely to arise in 
international economic bodies in which the Soviet Bloc was represented. Every effort should 
be made to develop coordinated policies in such cases. Also, NATO should give attention to 
concerting economic strategy, particularly strategic trade controls. In spite of this focus on 
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countering the new Soviet tactics, the US also advised caution in taking special action to meet 
the Soviet competition, such as attempting to meet politically motivated Soviet offers in the 
field of contracts for public works, even in politically sensitive areas.  
The US attitude towards economic cooperation bears witness to a divergence in perception 
between Europe and the US. Whereas several of the European NATO countries had quite far 
reaching ideas of extending economic cooperation, such as the full membership of the US in 
the OEEC, NATO financing of civil infrastructure programmes and aid to underdeveloped 
areas within the NATO territory, the US saw economic cooperation more in terms of 
consultation on economic matters and coordination of economic policies vis-à-vis the Soviet 
Bloc. The US tended to underestimate the amount of interest in extending economic 
cooperation that was present in the European governments, at least before May 1956.
176
 After 
the Ministerial Meeting of the NAC in May 1956, Dulles was frustrated by what he saw as the 
willingness of the NATO countries to “follow the Italian lead and have NATO turned into an 
economic organization which can probably extract a little more money out of the United 
States”.177  Thus while the US was very positive towards certain aspects of economic 
cooperation, such as consultation and coordination of policies, there was a more negative 
attitude towards some of the areas on which particularly Italy and France focused on. In 
addition to the frustration mentioned above, there was another reason for the US scepticism: 
both Dulles and Pearson agreed that the US and Canada should do more to encourage 
European economic integration.
178
 Similarly, Eisenhower was of the opinion that nothing 
should be done that would hinder further European integration, a view Dulles made clear in 
his remarks at the NAC Ministerial Meeting in December 1956.
179
 Thus it seems that the US 
saw the different means of extending economic cooperation as a choice between building 
Europe and helping Europe build itself.  
The US focus on coordination of policy is perhaps easier to explain. The US viewed the new 
Soviet focus on peaceful coexistence as a ploy, a divide and conquer tactic aimed at 
weakening the unity of the Alliance.
180
 This tactic could best be countered by extending 
cooperation in general, to cement the unity within, and by coordinating policies towards the 
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Soviet Bloc in particular, to avoid the appearance that NATO didn‟t speak with one voice. 
With regard to economic matters, the US position was clear in advising that NATO act as a 
bloc in organizations where the Soviet Bloc was represented, as opposed to in political 
matters, where the US was wary of NATO appearing to take positions as a bloc.
181
  
The question of aid to underdeveloped areas was one fraught with difficulties. Again there 
was a difference in perception on the two sides of the Atlantic. Certain of the European 
members, Italy in particular, were positive to the idea of developing areas within the NATO 
area, such as Southern Italy. The US did not agree that this was a suitable area of focus for 
NATO. Aid to underdeveloped areas outside of NATO, however, was seen as an important 
issue. Discussions in the NSC show that the Eisenhower administration was worried about 
what the CIA called “a pattern of coordinated long-term and high-level operations designed to 
advance Communist influence” in underdeveloped areas.182 Indeed, Vice President Richard 
Nixon expressed doubt as to whether the US “held adequate cards to play against the Soviet 
Bloc” in this regard.183 However, it was at the same time recognized that NATO was not an 
appropriate vessel for aid to the underdeveloped world, for several reasons. NATO was 
regarded primarily as a military organization, and counted among its members all the major 
Western colonial powers. It was therefore doubtful if NATO could appear as an acceptable 
agency for giving aid.
184
 There was also the question of whether it was at all possible for the 
US to channel aid through NATO. Senator George advised that Congress was reluctant to 
funnel aid through the UN, and would probably be as reluctant to funnelling aid through 
NATO.
185
 The US emphasis on taking advantage of existing agencies again demonstrates the 
US view of the adequacy of existing institutions. It is important also to note that although the 
US was enthusiastic about using economic cooperation within NATO to counter the new 
Soviet tactics, taking special action to meet Soviet competition in the underdeveloped world, 
such as in the field of contracts for public works, was not seen as advisable. The US did not 
want to become enmeshed in a bidding war with the Soviet Union.
186
  
An interesting point is that in the US view economic cooperation was ideologically limited. 
Cooperation was necessary when it came to coordinating policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Bloc, 
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and when the situation called for it to resolve internal conflicts. But a limiting factor for the 
US was the distinction between “the conflicts of commercial interests as a result of 
competitive market forces and those which spring from actions of governments which impede 
such forces to the detriment of the interests of other members of the Alliance”.187 In other 
words, the US asserted that a clear distinction needed to be made between conflicts resulting 
from the competitive factor inherent in the Western capitalist system and those resulting from 
attempts at protectionism and obstruction of free trade.  
There was also an element of ideology in the attitude towards economic aid to 
underdeveloped areas. In a discussion concerning economic assistance to underdeveloped 
areas in the NSC in late 1955, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson commented that aid 
programs that involved building or financing industrial installations in underdeveloped 
countries were problematic because if “the ultimate owner was the state, we would be helping 
these countries to proceed down the road which led to state socialism or to Communism”, a 
view that had some support in the NSC.
188
 President Eisenhower, however, did not see this as 
a point of crucial importance, pointing to the fact that several US allies, such as Norway and 
Denmark, were “far more socialized than the US”.189  
 
3.3 Cultural Cooperation 
While the US position was relatively positive with regard to economic cooperation, there was 
a cooler attitude towards cultural cooperation through NATO. While it was pointed out that 
there were distinct advantages in cooperative or joint action in this field, it was also asserted 
that cultural cooperation was not an end in itself. Priority should be given to projects that 
benefited from joint action, and special emphasis should be put on projects that had a catalytic 
effect in terms of fostering unity. The main emphasis in the US position on cultural 
cooperation was that governments should mainly support and supplement private initiative. In 
addition, it was felt that NATO should not directly support influential NGOs, or large scale 
youth gatherings, although it was stated that close and frequent contact between such 
organizations was highly desirable.  
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A field of cultural cooperation on which the US attitude was far more positive was that of 
cooperation in science and technology, where it was stated that this should be one of the most 
important and urgent objectives of the Alliance. This should not be limited to the manpower 
aspect, such as recruitment and training of scientists and technicians, but encompass the entire 
field of science and technology.  The joint Norwegian-Danish proposal for a common 
research institute was said to have some merit, although further study would be needed for the 
US to support this fully. In addition, consideration should be given to establishing „Atlantic 
Chairs‟, visiting professorships, Atlantic seminars and Atlantic Community prizes at 
universities. Finally, it was considered that exchanges of personnel were valuable, and that 
consideration should also be given to limited exchanges with ANZUS, SEATO and Baghdad 
Pact members.  
An important issue in terms of cultural cooperation in the US view was the question of 
financing. It was suggested that certain joint educational activities and a common research 
institute could be commonly financed, and it was recognized that a satisfactory increase in 
scientific cooperation would necessitate large government subsidies. Cooperation between 
private groups, however, should be financed by the groups involved. It was also pointed out 
that the financial implications of joint action would have to be dealt with realistically.  
The US position on cultural cooperation was markedly dualistic in its approach. While it was 
emphasized that closer cultural ties and cooperation were vital in cultivating a sense of 
community and strengthening relations between members, the US was not prepared to commit 
to any specific NATO cultural programme, at least not until such a program was more clearly 
defined. This duality stemmed from two factors.  
First, the US focused on encouraging private initiative in order to foster closer cultural ties 
between NATO members, as opposed to direct government intervention. This reflected the 
belief in the primacy of private initiative which is inherent in American society, where 
individualism and success through private initiative are considered integral to the American 
dream. Closer cultural ties and cooperation between NATO members was seen as desirable, 
but it was believed that the role of government should be to support and facilitate such private 
cooperation.  
The second factor was the question of the financial implications of a NATO cultural 
programme. The US already felt that Europe was unwilling to contribute enough financially 
to other aspects of the Alliance, and in some quarters there was fear that the new focus on 
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non-military cooperation represented another attempt at extracting further financial support 
from the US.
190
 This is also evident in the US reply to the NATO questionnaire, where it is 
specified that “member governments must be prepared to deal realistically with the financial 
implications of proposed cultural projects to be undertaken within a NATO framework” 
(emphasis mine).
191
 
While the US was apprehensive in with regard to certain aspects of cultural cooperation, the 
position on cooperation in the field of science and technology was another matter completely. 
This positive attitude can be explained by the fact that there was a general feeling that the 
West would not be able to maintain its technological superiority versus the Soviet Bloc 
without a concerted effort to, among other things, develop “an adequate number of highly 
qualified scientists and engineers” and to maintain “an expanding system of technological 
institutions and facilities”.192 It was believed that the US was approaching a decisive period in 
which it was vital that the US continue to maintain “short-run technological superiority”.193  
 
3.4 Cooperation in the Information field 
In general, the US position on cooperation in the information field was based on a stated 
awareness that wide popular support was “the indispensable basis for the strength and 
cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance”.194 In the US view, this support depended mainly on 
keeping the public informed of the accomplishments and goals of NATO. However, it was 
believed that expanding cooperation in this field would be difficult, due to a lack of 
agreement on the objectives and purposes of NATO activities in this area. US suggestions for 
such objectives and purposes included disseminating information about the Atlantic 
Community both within and outside the NATO area, countering Communist propaganda in 
the NATO area, and developing a more effective information programme directed at the 
Communist Bloc. However, it was also stated that an agreement on objectives and purposes 
should also emphasize that the individual governments should retain the primary 
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responsibility for informational activities, while using NATO to harmonize national policies 
and information programmes. 
195
 
The US position on cooperation in the information field can be described as having two dual 
objectives. On the one hand, there was a defensive aspect. First, a NATO information 
programme would be aimed inward, through dissemination of comprehensive information 
compiled by the NATO Information Service, to the peoples of the NATO area by the 
individual governments, in order to bolster public support of the Alliance.  Second, an 
information programme would also be aimed outward, informing people outside the NATO 
area in order to remove misconceptions and create a favourable view of the Alliance. 
However, it was maintained that if such information was to be directly released by NATO, the 
materials should not be susceptible to characterization as propaganda. No such limitation 
would be necessary for materials provided for the individual national services. 
196
 
On the other hand, there was an offensive aspect to the US position on cooperation in the 
information field.  First, NATO members should cooperate in countering Communist 
propaganda in the NATO area. It was acknowledged that the different situations that existed 
between the NATO members made close coordination in this field impractical, but it was felt 
that basic approaches should at least be coordinated, and members should share information 
on Communist propaganda activities. Second, NATO should aid the individual member 
governments in sharing propaganda materials aimed at the Communist Bloc.
197
 
As was the case with the US position on economic cooperation, the position on cooperation in 
the information field also stemmed at least partially from a perception of changes in Soviet 
tactics. As the Soviet Union would attempt to create division and disunity in the Alliance 
through renewed propaganda initiatives, it was important to coordinate the individual 
responses to these initiatives. Soviet policy towards non-NATO areas and the way in which 
the Soviet Union was perceived by underdeveloped countries also had a bearing on the US 
position. The extrovert defensive aspect of the US position was aimed at creating a favourable 
view of NATO in non-NATO areas mainly to counter any positive views of the Communist 
Bloc. In this regard there was concern at the highest levels in the US administration that 
underdeveloped regions might look to the Soviet economic system rather than the Western 
capitalist system, due to the extremely rapid industrialization that the Soviet Union had 
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successfully undergone under the Communist regime.
198
 Therefore, the accomplishments and 
goals of NATO needed to be emphasised by disseminating information about the Alliance in 
non-NATO areas. 
 
 3.5 Organizational and Functional Changes 
The general US approach as to whether extending non-military cooperation would necessitate 
any organizational changes was that while certain changes would be necessary, it was not 
necessary to alter or amend the Treaty in order to achieve results. The changes proposed 
included the creation of a new consultative mechanism to supplement the existing 
arrangements, improving the International Staff and creating additional ad hoc Council 
Committees in connection with the enlarged scope of consultation. The new consultative 
mechanism would be created through the designation by each member government of a so-
called Ministerial Delegate, “an outstanding person of sub-cabinet or equivalent rank to meet 
periodically with similarly-designated officials”.199 These delegates would meet several times 
annually at regular intervals, and on special occasions when necessary.  
The US also believed that the role of the Secretary General needed to be enhanced. It was 
suggested that the Secretary General should preside at all Council meetings, propose agenda 
items, serve as chairman of special Council Committees and represent NATO in international 
conferences of interest to NATO. In addition, the US proposed that the Secretary General 
should annually submit a State of the Alliance message, similar to the customary Presidential 
State of the Union address in the US.  
Throughout the US reply to the NATO questionnaire it was held that an extension of non-
military cooperation was possible without any far-reaching organizational changes. Similarly, 
it was continuously maintained that the Treaty was adequate as it was. It is not surprising that 
the US did not wish to alter or amend the North Atlantic Treaty. As previously discussed with 
regard to the question of jurisdiction in inter-member disputes, the fact that altering the Treaty 
entailed resubmitting it to Congress for approval precluded any changes to the Treaty.  
The designation of Ministerial Delegates can be explained by the reluctance of the US to 
accommodate the wishes of some of the NATO members for more frequent Council meetings 
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at ministerial level. Dulles clearly stated in a conversation with Pearson that no US Secretary 
of State would be able to dedicate more time and energy to NATO matters than he himself 
had done.
200
 This problem might be alleviated to some degree by the proposed new 
mechanism.  
 
3.6 Conclusions 
The US position on non-military cooperation reflected a tendency of general support 
moderated by political realities. The US supported, in theory, extension of cooperation in 
every field. In practice, however, the US had reservations in every proposed field of 
cooperation. While supporting consultation on a wide range of political questions, the US had 
responsibilities in other regions and to other organizations that would at times hamper 
consultation in NATO. In addition, there were constitutional and systemic limitations to how 
far the US could go. The US supported economic cooperation in most fields, but was careful 
to avoid anything that would hamper European integration. While supporting the idea of 
extending aid to underdeveloped areas, the US recognised that NATO was not a suitable 
vehicle for such aid. The US was not averse to resolving inter-member disputes in economic 
matters, as long as the disputes were not caused by healthy competition inherent in the 
capitalist system.  Cultural cooperation was supported in principle, as long as the primacy of 
private initiative was maintained. Dissemination of propaganda was supported, but it was 
emphasised that it was important that the material disseminated did not appear to be NATO 
propaganda.  
In the two previous chapters we have seen the Norwegian and US positions on non-military 
cooperation outlined and analysed. These positions were the result of many factors, both 
internal and external. In the next chapter the respective positions and the factors they were 
based on will be compared, and any similarities or differences will be analysed. It is also 
necessary to place these positions and their background into a bigger picture.  
  
                                                 
200
 NA, Department of State, Central Files, 711.56321, “CA-10252: Conversation with Foreign Minister Pearson 
on Developing Atlantic Unity”. 
56 
 
  
57 
 
Chapter Four- Comparative and Synthesis 
 
Having analyzed the Norwegian and the US positions on non-military cooperation in NATO 
and their immediate explanations, it would be interesting to provide a comparison. Given the 
disparity in stature between these two NATO members one might expect that the differences 
in position outweighed the similarities. This was not the case. The Norwegian and the US 
positions were remarkably similar, and some of the differences that existed were contrary to 
expectations.  
In addition to comparing the Norwegian and US positions on non-military cooperation, this 
chapter also analyzes the impact of the Suez Crisis on both the Norwegian and the US 
positions as well as on the work of the Committee of Three. The Suez Crisis has been seen as 
an illustration of the lack of consultation in NATO, and has been considered to have negated 
any potential results that might have been achieved by the Committee of Three.  
The final part of this chapter attempts to place the Committee of Three into a bigger picture. 
The Norwegian position on non-military cooperation must be understood relative to the more 
general history of Norwegian foreign policy during the Cold War. The US position on non-
military cooperation, on the other hand, can perhaps more easily be understood relative to the 
history of the transatlantic relationship during the Cold War.   
 
4.1 Similarities and differences in the Norwegian and the US positions 
The Norwegian and the US positions on non-military cooperation coincided on several issues. 
In terms of the main focus of the positions, the desirable scope of cooperation, the importance 
of cooperation to the Alliance, the position of the West relative to the Soviet Bloc, what 
limitations should be placed on cooperation and the possibility of extending aid through 
NATO, the Norwegian and US positions were mostly in line.  
First of all, the general focus of both Governments was very similar. It was clear that the main 
objective regarding extending non-military cooperation was to strengthen the habit of 
consultation in the NAC. In addition, both Norway and the US emphasised the importance of 
not duplicating the work being done in other international bodies in which the NATO 
members were represented. This was based on the view that the existing cooperative bodies 
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were adequate. Neither Government saw a need for establishing new institutions, nor was 
there any desire to add new organizational structures to NATO. 
Second, concerning what the scope of cooperation should be the Norwegian and the US 
positions also coincided, particularly with regards to political consultation and economic 
cooperation. Both Norway and the US were in favour of consultations on a wide range of 
subjects. On the one hand, there was practically no limit to the types of questions the US 
considered to be suitable. Norway, on the other hand, were also in favour of a wide scope of 
consultation, but shied away from so-called out-of-area issues. In addition to favouring a wide 
scope, there was a shared negativity to establishing rigid rules for determining what matters 
were appropriate for consultation, as well as what the procedure should be in inter-member 
disputes. Regarding inter-member disputes there was agreement, however, that it was 
important that no member should be able to keep disputes out of the NAC. In economic 
matters, both Governments agreed that the scope of issues suitable for consultation should be 
narrow. Only in cases where an issue had not received satisfactory attention elsewhere, or 
where it was important to avoid conflicting views, should the NAC be used to consult on 
economic matters. In addition, both Norway and the US were in favour of consultation in the 
NAC on economic issues with wider strategic implications.  
Third, Norway and the US were mostly in agreement on questions concerning foreign aid. 
Both Governments were negative to extending aid through NATO to underdeveloped areas 
within or outside the NATO area, although they both agreed that furthering development of 
such areas was an important task. However, both Norway and the US also agreed that it 
would be useful to consult on basic policies in this field, and on strategic issues that might 
arise in relation to development. The attitude that aid to the underdeveloped countries was 
important was also based on the same view that underdeveloped countries were more 
susceptible to Soviet advances, as well as the danger that those countries would look to the 
Soviet economic model as a more rapid means of industrialization.  
Indeed, both Norway and the US were aware that the new Soviet tactics presented new 
challenges, and this influenced to a great extent their attitude towards non-military 
cooperation in NATO. The sentiment that NATO should have a greater role in meeting the 
non-military aspects of Western relations with the Soviet Bloc had widespread support both in 
Washington and Oslo. To maintain unity it was imperative that NATO meet the Soviet threat 
in the political and economic fields as well as militarily. In the economic field both Norway 
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and the US agreed that it was important that the NATO members consult on economic 
policies towards the Soviet Bloc, as well as ways of countering and neutralising Soviet 
commercial practices. Further, both Norway and the US perceived what can be termed a 
technician gap, similar to the bomber gap and the later missile gap. Similar to the perception 
throughout the 1950‟s that the Soviet Union was gaining an advantage in strategic bombers, 
there was wide-spread fear that the West was also falling behind in training scientists and 
technicians. It was thought to be of the utmost importance to close this gap, through a 
concerted effort through NATO. 
In a more general sense, the Norwegian views on the importance of cooperation in NATO, as 
well as on the importance of placing limitations on such cooperation, largely coincided with 
those of the US. Both countries recognized the impossibility of adding functions to NATO 
that would in any way limit national sovereignty. Both Governments pointed out that they 
were responsible to their respective parliamentary bodies and electorates, and could not 
subjugate the process of policy formation to the NAC. Similarly, there was a deep-seated 
scepticism in general of anything remotely smacking of supranationality in international 
institutions in both capitals. In a narrower sense, it was agreed that certain forms of 
cooperation should not be the direct responsibility of NATO. Different forms of cultural 
cooperation in particular were thought to lie within the realm of private initiative, and it was 
felt that NATO‟s role should be to encourage and support rather than to initiate. In the 
Norwegian position this particularly applied to educational activities.  
The differences between the Norwegian and the US positions were far fewer. The tendency 
seemed to be that there was general agreement modified by slight divergences in some cases. 
In terms of the focus there was a slight predilection towards the UN on the part of the 
Norwegian Government. This was particularly a factor in the attitude towards cultural 
cooperation in general, and to the question of extending aid to underdeveloped areas. At the 
same time, it is important to remember that the main focus of the Norwegian position was on 
political cooperation, and in relation to this the focus was placed squarely on NATO.  
Concerning the scope of political cooperation there was also disparity. Though both 
Governments favoured a wide scope, the US did not want to exclude out-of-area issues from 
consultation in the NAC. This was contrary to the Norwegian focus on the territorial 
limitations set out in the Treaty. Norway, on the other hand, favoured an increase in 
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parliamentary cooperation in NATO. This attitude did, however, stop well short of extending 
consultative status to the parliamentary conferences.  
With regards to the limits of cooperation there were also slight dissimilarities. There was a 
tendency on the part of the US to go further in terms of how much cooperation was desirable. 
This did not only concern the scope of suitable subjects for consultation. However, it must be 
remembered that the actual US attitude and the public position it took on non-military 
cooperation were not the same. As pointed out earlier, the US spoke warmly of cooperation 
while at the same time recognizing that the limitations placed on cooperation by inherent 
factors in its political system, as well as by obligations to other regional arrangements, 
precluded such a measure of cooperation as the US position professed to support. A similar 
divergence between public position and internal attitude was present in the Norwegian 
Government, as previously discussed. In terms of meeting the Soviet threat the US was more 
positive to implementing more direct measures than was the case with the Norwegian 
Government. Likewise, in the field of information the US wanted the NIS to facilitate a 
propaganda effort by producing suitable material. It was pointed out that materials that were 
to be directly released by NATO should not be of a nature that could be characterized as 
propaganda, but that such a limitation did not apply to the national services. Norway, on the 
other hand, maintained that the NIS should focus on purely factual information aimed at 
enhancing public support in the member countries. As such it should mainly describe the 
goals and activities of NATO, a limitation the US did not see as necessary.  
Finally, in terms of organizational changes there was a slight difference of opinion. While 
neither Government saw the need for any concrete changes, the US suggested creating so-
called Ministerial Delegates. In addition, the US was in favour of enhancing the role of the 
Secretary General, while Norway was of the opinion that his role was sufficiently provided 
for in the Lisbon Decisions, and that all that was needed in this regard was a reaffirmation of 
his role.  
 
4.2 The positions of the other NATO members 
Although a thorough review of the positions of every member of the Alliance is well outside 
the scope of this thesis, a short summary is in order, based on the Committee‟s reports on the 
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consultations held with each member contained in the records of the Committee.
201
 The 
Canadian and Italian positions are thus excluded. France and the UK, who must be considered 
the two other Great Powers in the Alliance, held rather similar views. The French were in 
general agreement with the proposals of the Committee in most areas. They expressed support 
for political consultation in the NAC, with a wide scope allowing for discussion of out-of-area 
issues. There was also support for using NATO in settling inter-member disputes. The French 
were in favour of closer economic cooperation through consultation on economic questions in 
the NAC, including questions of foreign aid. However, France did not envision NATO having 
a direct role in extending aid. In terms of countering Soviet economic initiatives, the French 
view was that it was not enough merely to counter these initiatives. Rather, NATO should 
endeavour to take the initiative itself. Interestingly, according to France the most interesting 
field in its eyes was the organization of functions. The British position was in many ways in 
line with the French. The British also supported making use of the NAC for political 
consultation. Although the UK also suggested a wide scope of possible questions for 
discussion, the British view was that questions outside of the geographical area of NATO 
were not considered suitable. Another clear difference from the French position was that the 
UK did not see any benefits of using NATO to settle inter-member disputes. 
If one then considers the rest of the NATO members to be smaller states, at least relative to 
the US, France and the UK, it is nonetheless problematic to lump them together. Even the 
Benelux countries, although a homogenous group, differed in their opinions. Though Belgium 
and the Netherlands both supported extending political cooperation with a wide scope of 
possible issues for discussion, they disagreed on the desirability of using NATO to settle 
inter-member disputes. In addition, while Belgium favoured increased economic cooperation, 
and were very positive to cooperation in general, the Dutch were sceptical to economic 
cooperation. Greece and Turkey, making up NATO‟s southern flank, were both positive to 
political cooperation, although they were sceptical to using the NAC for settling inter-member 
disputes. Turkey had a clear focus on economic cooperation, and both these countries 
supported using NATO to extend aid to underdeveloped areas within NATO. Portugal and 
Germany, however dissimilar, held similar views on political cooperation, including support 
for a wide scope in political cooperation and for using the NAC for settlement of inter-
member disputes. On economic cooperation, on the other hand, Germany was positive while 
Portugal was generally negative. 
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The views of Denmark and Iceland were largely similar to those of Norway. Denmark was 
positive to political cooperation, though not necessarily to settling inter-member disputes in 
the NAC. However, in terms of inter-member disputes, Denmark would rather handle them 
within NATO than in the UN, an opinion shared by the Norwegian Government. The Danish 
view on economic cooperation was also in line with the Norwegian position; the Icelandic 
position, however, was not. Though Iceland supported the Committee‟s work in general, their 
focus was on economic cooperation. Citing the Icelandic fishery dispute as an example of 
economic conflict that would have benefitted from discussion in the NAC rather than the 
OEEC, Iceland also stressed cooperation in the economic field, commenting that the Soviet 
Union had in fact become the largest export market for Icelandic goods.  
The general impression after reviewing the positions of the other NATO members is that there 
was general agreement on the desirability of extending political cooperation, although this 
agreement did not extend to the issue of inter-member disputes. Concerning economic 
cooperation, however, there were differing views.  
 
4.3 The impact of the Suez Crisis 
As has been previously mentioned, the Suez Crisis was seen as a case in point of the lack of 
consultation, and is still considered to be the primary reason for a perceived lack of results of 
the work of the Committee of Three. The French-British aggression in the Middle East came 
without advance consultation with the NATO allies, indeed without even advance 
information. In fact, it would take several days before the French and British Permanent 
Representatives informed the allies on the matter. Boyesen stated that he had the impression 
that the Representatives “seemed uninstructed and unable to give the Council any 
information”.202 Thus the conclusion that the Suez Crisis represented a clear lack of 
consultation on a matter of interest to all of the NATO allies is unproblematic. The fact that 
Egypt lay outside the area stipulated by the Treaty was beside the point, as the conflict had 
implications both in terms of trade and the fact that central NATO members, and thus the 
Alliance itself, became susceptible to criticism from the Soviet Bloc. This susceptibility to 
Soviet criticism also limited the ability of the NATO countries to criticize Soviet actions in 
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Hungary. This was an integral part of the background for the chastising of France and the UK 
in the NAC. 
The Norwegian and US reactions to the events of the Crisis itself are not the subject here. But 
the effect the Suez Crisis had on Lange personally should be noted. As previously mentioned, 
Lange seriously considered resigning from the Committee and abandoning non-military 
cooperation, at least for the time being. A point concerning the reaction of Lange to the Suez 
Crisis in relation to non-military cooperation can be found also in the Algerian situation. The 
resentment at being presented with a fait accompli in the Algerian situation was a major factor 
in the Norwegian desire for increased political cooperation. That the French again undertook 
controversial actions in the Mediterranean without consultation in NATO even after pledging 
support for the Committee of Three was certainly part of the reason for Lange contemplating 
resignation. Dulles, on the other hand, came to the opposite conclusion. In addressing the 
news that Lange was considering resigning from the Committee, Dulles maintained that the 
Suez Crisis in fact reinforced the need for the Committee of Three, and that it was more 
important than ever that they finish their work and submit their report to the NAC.  
With all the focus on the Suez Crisis in the precise period that the Committee of Three were 
finishing their report on non-military cooperation in NATO, one might expect that both the 
Report itself and its treatment at the NAC Ministerial Meeting in December 1956 would be 
heavily preoccupied with the Crisis and the issues it raised. Interestingly, this was not the 
case. The Suez Crisis was indeed a hot topic at the December Ministerial Meeting, but not so 
much in relation to the Committee of Three. The clear focus in terms of the Suez Crisis was 
not so much on what went wrong, i.e. lack of consultation, as on the necessity of repairing 
relations within the Alliance and how to accomplish this. One way of repairing relations 
would of course be to stand together in approving the Committee‟s conclusions on the need 
for more consultation. 
 The main issue in the discussion surrounding the Report of the Committee of Three was not 
relative to the Suez Crisis, but on whether or not it should be published, and if so, whether it 
should be published as a report of the Council or as a report of the Committee of Three. On 
the one hand, these discussions were not independent of the Suez debacle. France in particular 
was wary of the possibility that the wording of the Report would be construed as criticism of 
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French-British actions.
203
 Similarly, the question of whether it would be published as a report 
of the Council or of the Committee played in. There would be a significant difference in the 
gravity of the criticism if it was published as a report of the Council. In the end it was agreed 
to publish the Report as a report of the Committee, while the Council approved a resolution 
supporting the Committee‟s conclusions.  
While the discussions revolved around language and how it should be published, it could also 
be expected that the Committee itself and the report would be significantly influenced by the 
Suez Crisis. Interestingly, the report itself did not receive any significant revisions in terms of 
the recommendations that were made. The Formal Record of Proceedings states that the 
Committee met on 14 November to re-examine the report in light of the Suez Crisis. No 
significant revisions are mentioned, and in the final Report the Suez Crisis is mentioned 
clearly only in the letter of transmittal, and in vaguer terms in the introductory chapter.  
As to whether the Suez Crisis cancelled any potential effects of the implementation of the 
Committee of Three‟s recommendations, the opposite can just as easily be maintained. The 
focus at the May 1956 Ministerial Meeting had been on the need to strengthen unity in order 
to more effectively meet the perceived new Soviet tactics. In this regard, the fact that the Suez 
Crisis was understood to reinforce the need for an effort to strengthen unity within NATO, 
particularly in the opinion of the US, would just as easily tend to reinforce the potential 
effects of such an implementation. Thus the reason for the limited results of the continued 
efforts to increase cooperation in NATO was more a result of the individual member 
countries‟ reluctance to relinquish sovereignty and to, in their own view, subjugate their 
national interests to that of the Alliance.  
 
4.4 Non-military cooperation in Norwegian foreign policy 
Cooperation in an Atlantic framework was a central part of Norwegian foreign policy as early 
as during the Second World War. Foreign Minister Trygve Lie, later to become the first 
Secretary General of the UN, was a vocal Atlanticist during his time as Foreign Minister 
during the war. In a break with his predecessor Halvdan Koht‟s line, Lie introduced a firmly 
                                                 
203
 NA, Department of State, Conference Files, Lot 62D181, CF 818, “POLTO 1408”. Telegram from the USRO 
to the State Department summarizing the restricted NAC morning session on 13 December 1956. 
65 
 
Atlantic dimension into Norwegian foreign policy.
 204
 Lie‟s policy stated that in the future 
Norway would look to cooperate with the US, and to a lesser degree the UK, in foreign 
policy. However, it should be made clear that non-military cooperation within an Atlantic 
framework was not what Lie had in mind. Lie‟s Atlantic policy was geared strictly toward 
security and defence. Economic, social and cultural cooperation was also considered 
important to the maintenance of world peace, but could more appropriately be handled within 
a global rather than regional framework. In any case, after the end of the war Lie rejected the 
notion of a regional arrangement, even if Article 52 of the UN Charter allowed for regional 
security arrangements. In Lie‟s opinion, international cooperation and peace would now be 
adequately safeguarded through the UN.
205
   
Lie‟s thoughts on an Atlantic policy were conditioned by the public mood at the end of the 
war, leading to his rejection of regional security arrangements. The political climate in 
Norway was not receptive to the idea of an Atlantic security arrangement. This mood was 
evident not only in public opinion, but also among most politicians, particularly those who 
had not been part of the Government in exile in London. Many central figures in the new 
Government had had a very different experience during the war, which in many ways 
conditioned their outlook. Lange and Gerhardsen, for example, had both spent most of the war 
in German concentration camps.  
Lange had been critical of Lie‟s Atlantic policy all along.206 When Lange took up the post of 
Foreign Minister after the war, Norway would continue to emphasise international 
cooperation through the UN, a policy which has received the misnomer bridge-building, 
implying an active policy aimed at reconciling the two emerging blocs after the war. This was 
not the case.
207
 Even after the 2
nd
 General Assembly of the UN, at which it was clear that the 
cooperative spirit that the Norwegian policy presupposed was rapidly disappearing, Norway 
clung to the notion of an adequate security arrangement through the UN, despite crass 
criticisms from the US and the UK.
208
 Not until the international situation had changed to 
such a degree as to make an independent security policy impossible did Lange embrace a 
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westward orientation.
209
 The Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet overtures 
towards Finland greatly influenced the Governments view of Soviet intentions in 1948.  
When Norway did become part of a regional security arrangement in NATO in 1949, Lange 
would become a vocal supporter of a wider framework for Atlantic cooperation. As early as 
May 1950, Lange stated that it was desirable to study extending non-military cooperation.
210
 
Thus over a period of just four years Lange had gone from being critical of Atlantic 
cooperation at all to being in favour of an extension of such cooperation. Indeed, Lange was 
part of the Pearson Group that studied the possibilities of such an extension.  However, the 
pendulum would seem to have swung the other way by 1956, by which time there is evident 
apprehensions particularly towards political cooperation.  
The formation of Norwegian foreign policy has been based on the axiom that as a small state 
Norway was best served with a binding international order of law.
211
 This would suggest that 
it was in the interest of Norway to develop as close a degree of cooperation as possible within 
NATO. However, the realization that close political cooperation and a greater amount of 
consultation in the NAC would entail sharing responsibilities for decisions over which 
Norway had little control led to a more reserved position on political cooperation than was in 
line with such an axiom. The Norwegian duality on this issue, both in terms of wanting and 
not wanting political cooperation, as well as in terms of the stated axiom, is characteristic of 
Norwegian foreign policy, particularly in relation to NATO. As Lundestad has argued, 
Norway tended towards scepticism towards concrete suggestions of cooperation, usually 
leading to a conclusion that if Norway was to participate, it would need special 
arrangements.
212
 
 
Another factor in Norwegian foreign policy that must be seen in relation to the Committee of 
Three is the primacy of the Atlantic circle. Eriksen and Pharo state that Norwegian foreign 
policy was conducted within four circles: a global, an Atlantic, a Western European and a 
Nordic. Of these, the Atlantic circle was the primary.
213
 However, the official line of the 
Norwegian Government was not always clear with regards to the relationship between these 
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circles. For example, Lange stated in December 1956 that “in conflicts of NATO-UN 
interests, the UN‟s is overriding”.214 More directly related to non-military cooperation, in 
terms of cultural cooperation the Norwegian emphasis was on UNESCO. Similarly, in 
relation to foreign aid Norway emphasized the desirability of all the NATO allies supporting 
the proposed SUNFED. On the other hand, regarding political conflicts between members 
Norway agreed with the US that it was best to keep such conflicts out of the UN. None of this 
is to say that the Atlantic circle was not the primary focus of Norwegian foreign policy. Lange 
could well merely be paying lip service to NATO skeptics at home, of which there were quite 
a few, particularly in certain parts of the Labour Party, but also within the Government itself. 
The point is merely to illustrate that in cases where it was seen as appropriate, the stated 
Norwegian focus would be on the UN, not NATO. However, one did not necessarily exclude 
the other. In any case, the security dimension of the membership in NATO meant that as long 
as membership in the UN did not provide a security guarantee, Norway would afford NATO 
primacy in its foreign policy.  
 
4.5 Non-military cooperation and the transatlantic relationship 
A useful first step in examining the impact of non-military cooperation on the transatlantic 
relationship is to look at US policy regarding non-military cooperation in the period. In 
September 1951, at the same time the Pearson Group was established to study the possibilities 
of non-military cooperation, Dulles states that it was a major US objective at the Council 
Session in Ottawa to reassure the NATO allies that the US saw the Alliance as having more 
than a military function without regard for “economic and social realities or cultural 
matters”.215 Thus it would seem that the immediate reasoning behind the US support for the 
establishment of the Pearson Group was a desire to reassure her allies rather than a wish to 
extend non-military cooperation.
216
 By the time of the May 1956 Ministerial Meeting, 
however, the US view was that non-military cooperation had become an important aspect of 
meeting the new Soviet tactics. Of course, this reorientation could well have had more to do 
with the Soviet change of tactics than a genuine wish for further transatlantic integration.  
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The transatlantic relationship, through and beyond the Cold War, has often been characterized 
as one beset with internal conflict. This characterization is of course very relevant to the issue 
of extending non-military cooperation in NATO. The focus of non-military cooperation was 
after all to strengthen unity within the Atlantic Alliance. Lawrence Kaplan maintains that the 
military and political reinforcements the Alliance underwent in the wake of the Korean War 
in order to enable NATO to meet a Soviet military challenge created new divisions between 
the US and her allies.
217
 In relation to the Committee of Three it should be pointed out that the 
search for a means of extending non-military cooperation was in part an answer to one such 
disagreement. The establishment of the Committee of Three was justified by referring to the 
need for strengthening unity. However, it must also be pointed out that the desire for 
strengthening unity was not based on a perceived need to resolve internal tensions, but rather 
on the perception of a new Soviet threat that could not be met by military cooperation alone.  
If one sees the history of NATO as being one of close cooperation, the Committee of Three 
should be seen primarily as an effort to strengthen unity. In measuring the results of the 
Committee, if one accepts that the goal in establishing the Committee was to face an external 
threat rather than internal divisions, then whether the goal was met or not is not the only point. 
Rather, the fact that the attempt was made at all speaks to the desires among the allies to 
cooperate more closely. 
In short, regarding the relationship between non-military cooperation and the transatlantic 
relationship, it depends on the angle of view. The incessant calls for strengthening unity can 
be seen as proof that closeness of cooperation was lacking. On the other hand, the continuous 
focus on the need for maintaining as close a relationship as possible could just as well be a 
result of the member countries merely realizing that more cooperation was beneficial, rather 
than that cooperation was nonexistent.    
 
4.6 Conclusions 
In comparison, the degree of similarity in the Norwegian and the US positions on non-military 
cooperation was striking. One might expect that the disparity in stature of these two countries 
would have imparted fundamental differences in policy, and that these differences would have 
led to greatly differing outlooks on the possible benefits of non-military cooperation. As we 
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have seen, this was not the case. However, it is interesting to note that these positions were 
arrived at through fundamentally different reasoning.  
Norwegian foreign policy was based on the axiom that small states benefit from a binding 
international order of law. It was only the inability of the UN to provide an adequate security 
arrangement that made it necessary to join a regional security arrangement, in which the US 
would inevitably be the dominant partner. With such an imbalance of power within the 
Alliance it would be in the interest of Norway to extend non-military cooperation, particularly 
in the political field. However, in a typical example of the duality of Norwegian foreign 
policy, Norway was actually quite apprehensive regarding closer political cooperation.  
The US, on the other hand, as the dominant partner in the Alliance, could not be expected to 
support establishing habits of consultation that would give the smaller states in NATO a 
louder voice. However, as we have seen, the US was willing to submit almost any category of 
question for consultation in the NAC, albeit with certain reservations. But these reservations 
were not so much a result of a genuine reluctance to afford Western Europe primacy in US 
foreign policy, as a wish to avoid giving the impression to the other regional arrangements of 
which the US was a participant that this was indeed the case.  
The Suez Crisis has been seen to have had a great impact on the work of the Committee of 
Three and their conclusions. This assumption needs to be reconsidered. While it is 
unquestionable that the Suez Crisis had an impact on the Committee of Three, in particular 
Lange, it did not change their conclusions. On the contrary, the conclusions of the Report 
were not really altered when the Committee re-examined the Report in the wake of Suez. The 
discussions surrounding the Report were influenced by the impact of the Suez Crisis, but 
hardly in a manner that would indicate that there was a lack of acceptance of the Committee‟s 
conclusions. In retrospect it could easily be maintained that the Suez Crisis had the effect of 
reinforcing the conclusions of the Committee, and that the apparent lack of results of 
implementing the Committee‟s suggestions was as much due to unwillingness on the part of 
the NATO members to relinquish sovereignty.  
In the concluding chapter of this thesis the Committee of Three will be placed in a historical 
context in terms of its importance in the evolution of NATO as a political entity, its effect on 
the situation NATO faced in relation to the détente of the 1960‟s and -70‟s, and the relation of 
non-military cooperation to European integration. Finally, the thesis is placed in relation to 
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existing research, in terms of the history of Norwegian foreign policy, the history of the 
transatlantic relationship and NATO.  
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Chapter Five- Conclusions 
 
The goal of this concluding chapter is threefold. In addition to presenting a more general 
conclusion this chapter will also place the issue of non-military cooperation in NATO in a 
historical perspective by looking at the relationship between the Committee of Three and the 
evolution of NATO as a political entity, the role of NATO in the détente of the 1960‟s and -
70‟s and the process of European integration. Finally, it is necessary to place these findings in 
relation to the existing research in the field.  
 
5.1 General Conclusions 
The Committee of Three was established in part to address a perceived need for strengthening 
the unity of the Alliance. This need had its background in what was seen as a change in Soviet 
tactics following the 20
th
 Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, at which the 
Soviet leadership distanced itself from the Stalinist ideology of inevitable war, emphasising in 
stead the possibility of peaceful coexistence. There was a clear difference between the 
rationale behind the US suggestion to establish the Committee of Three and its attitude toward 
the previous effort to extend non-military cooperation in 1951. Whereas the US saw the 
Pearson Group as a method of reassuring allies who were increasingly uneasy about the one-
sidedness of the Alliance, the US suggestion to establish the Committee of Three was based 
on a genuine wish to find new ways of meeting the changing Soviet threat. Whereas the 
establishment of the Committee of Three has previously been seen mainly as a call for 
changing the “NATO method” of decision making emanating from the smaller nations in the 
Alliance, this thesis shows that this was not the case. Not only was the Committee established 
at the suggestion of the largest member of the Alliance, but there was widespread agreement 
among the members on the need to extend non-military cooperation, not to change the 
decision making process but to counter the new Soviet threat.  
In spite of Lange‟s wish for a clear definition of purpose to be stated by the NAC in 
ministerial session, the Committee in the end had to define its own terms of reference.  These 
terms of reference were formulated after consulting with other members, including the US. 
This shows again that the Committee of Three was not a cri-de-cœur from the smaller nations, 
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as Kaplan has stated.
218
 After the Committee had thus defined its mandate, it proceeded to 
consult thoroughly with the other members of the Alliance through the questionnaire and the 
following consultations. The process of compiling the Committee‟s report was completed 
before the schism between the US and the UK and France fully developed over the Suez 
Crisis, and though the report was revised in the aftermath of Suez, the conclusions of the 
report were unchanged. The impact of Suez on the work of the Committee mainly manifested 
itself in Lange‟s contemplated resignation, and in terms of the report of the Committee mainly 
in the letter of transmittal rather than the report itself. Thus it is evident that the Suez Crisis 
did not change the conclusions of the Committee, rather it had the effect of emphasising the 
need for extending non-military cooperation.  
While it is unnecessary to repeat the respective positions on non-military cooperation here, 
some general observations are in order. The Norwegian and the US positions on non-military 
cooperation both emphasised political consultation on a wide range of questions. In general, 
both Norway and the US were positive to extending political cooperation, including providing 
mechanisms for dealing with inter-member disputes. Similarly, both were clearly negative to 
most forms of economic cooperation in NATO, based largely on the perceived adequacy of 
existing organizations in the field. Cultural and informational cooperation were afforded less 
emphasis, with the exception of the possibility of a cooperative effort in training technicians 
and scientists.  
The striking thing when seeing these positions in comparison is the large degree of similarity. 
Based on the differences between these to states in terms of size and power, it could be 
expected that their conclusions as to the desirability of extending cooperation would be 
different. However, this thesis shows that the US and the Norwegian official positions were 
mostly in agreement. More important, on the other hand, is the similarity between the actual 
attitudes in Washington and Oslo. Both Governments were quite vocal in their support for the 
Committee‟s project, while at the same time they realized that the amount of cooperation that 
was being discussed went too far for either Government to accept. In the case of both Norway 
and the US the desire for increased cooperation met with the unassailable obstacle of 
maintaining national sovereignty.  
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5.2 Détente and the Evolution of NATO as a Political Entity 
“The Future Tasks of the Alliance”, better known as the Harmel Report, approved in 
December 1967, is credited with having “blunted centrifugal pressures that might have led to 
the Alliance‟s dissolution”, as well as having “set NATO on a course that ultimately led to the 
end of the Cold War”.219 The survival of the Alliance after the disappearance of its raison 
d‟être with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 can be credited to its ability to function as 
a political entity, rather than solely as an organization with the single goal of mutual defence. 
Thus the Harmel Report stands out as a milestone in the history of NATO. Kaplan maintains 
that “the participants in the Harmel exercise were repeating the appeal of the Wise Men of 
1956 ...who tried in vain to tell the larger powers that their voices should be heard”.220 
Though Kaplan‟s conclusion that the Committee of Three was a call from the smaller powers 
is wrong, he is right in stating that the Harmel exercise to a large degree reiterated the 
conclusions of the Committee of Three. Thus it is evident that the Harmel initiative owed a 
debt to the Committee of Three and that the Harmel exercise in fact can be seen as a 
consequence of the efforts to extend non-military cooperation in the 1950‟s. The point is not 
that the Harmel Report built on the conclusions of the Committee of Three, but rather that if 
the Harmel Report represented the frustrated voices of the smaller nations of the Alliance, 
these frustrations were amplified by the fact that the conclusions of the Harmel Report was at 
least in part a repetition of the conclusions of the Committee of Three. In other words, the 
Harmel Report established NATO as a political entity, and the origins of the Harmel initiative 
can be found at least in part in the work of the Committee of Three in 1956. Thus the work of 
the Committee of Three, far from being negated by the Suez Crisis, constituted an integral 
part of the road to giving NATO a political role.  
In addition to the aforementioned influence on the evolution of NATO as a political entity, 
and in the same vein, the Committee of Three must be said to have influenced the way NATO 
responded to the international climate of the 1960‟s and -70‟s. In a period characterized by 
rapprochement between East and West, the lessons learned in the 1950‟s were a factor in how 
the Alliance reacted. As noted above, the Harmel Report established NATO as a political 
entity, and was in part a reaction to the international situation. It represented an effort to work 
towards a stable settlement in Europe through a policy of détente. The idea of meeting a 
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perceived lessened military threat from the Soviet Bloc by emphasizing the political aspect of 
the Alliance was also part of the background of the Committee of Three.  
 
5.3 Non-Military Cooperation and European Integration 
When placing the Committee of Three into a historical perspective the question arises as to 
whether the work towards extending non-military cooperation was conducive or hindering to 
European integration. As mentioned in Chapter Three, both Dulles and Eisenhower agreed 
that the US should do more to encourage European integration, and that nothing should be 
done in terms of extending economic cooperation that might hinder such integration.   
A central factor in the transatlantic relationship has been the relationship between US policy 
and European integration. Furthering European integration was a clearly stated objective in 
US foreign policy during this period. To briefly recap some of Lundestad‟s arguments of 
relevance here, the striking thing about the US position on European integration in relation to 
an Atlantic framework is not the implicit emphasis on such a framework, but rather the direct 
support given to European integration. Throughout the 50‟s the US opposed every British 
push for unambiguous Atlantic solutions, for example rearmament of Germany in NATO, an 
OEEC approach to cooperation in atomic energy or an Atlantic free-trade area. However, 
despite this opposition, the US administration continued to take the wider Atlantic framework 
for European integration for granted.  
The point of relevance to this thesis is that the US strongly supported European integration, 
taking it for granted that such integration would take place within an Atlantic framework. 
Thus strengthening the Atlantic framework in general would be conducive to European 
integration. Extending non-military cooperation would tend to cement the framework, and as 
long as one was careful not to cooperate in a manner that would hinder European integration, 
all was well. Thus the US could safely support extending non-military cooperation as it would 
be helpful in achieving an important objective. Still, there were obvious limits on what the US 
could participate in.   
 
5.4 The History of Norwegian Foreign Policy 
This thesis can be seen in relation to three interpretations of Norwegian foreign policy in the 
Cold War. While it seems evident in the Norwegian position that the Norwegian Government 
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desired a greater degree of consultations and information, we have seen that there existed 
serious doubts as to what this would entail in terms of increased responsibility, and in fact 
whether this was at all desirable. This is in line with Tamnes‟ theory of integration and 
screening. Norway desired integration in relation to the West, while at the same time it was 
seen as necessary to follow a policy of screening towards the NATO allies. However, the 
point was not to avoid conflict with the Soviet Union, but to avoid being involved in conflicts 
and matters over which Norway had no control or possibility of assuming responsibility. This 
also corresponds with Lundestad‟s argument that Norway tended towards skepticism 
concerning concrete suggestions of integration, usually leading to demands for special 
arrangements. In the case of non-military cooperation, the core of the Norwegian attitude was 
that it was desirable that the consultative machinery in NATO be strengthened and extended, 
while at the same time Norway did not actually want to consult on issues over which it could 
not exercise control itself. While not going so far as to making concrete demands for special 
arrangements, this is nonetheless an example of the dualism present in Norwegian foreign 
policy. 
In terms of Eriksen and Pharo‟s view that the North Atlantic circle in foreign policy was 
accepted by the Government, as well as most leading politicians, as the most important, the 
findings concerning the Norwegian position on non-military cooperation correspond with this. 
Still, it must be pointed out that while the focus of Norwegian foreign policy was on NATO, 
there is an interesting duality evident both in the position on non-military cooperation and in 
the stated policy of Lange in terms of the relationship between NATO and the UN. While it is 
undeniable that with regards to the security dimension of Norwegian foreign policy NATO 
had absolute primacy, in relation to economic and cultural cooperation focus was at times 
placed more on the UN.  
 
5.5 The History of the Transatlantic Relationship 
Kaplan has stated that the Committee of Three was an effort to remedy a situation where the 
smaller states in NATO felt that they were on the sidelines in the decision-making process. 
While it may well be that the smaller states in NATO felt sidelined, it must be kept in mind 
that the Committee of Three was actually established at the suggestion of the US supported by 
the UK. This could of course simply have been based on the same attitude that the US had had 
towards the Pearson Group, i.e. that it was necessary to reassure the smaller states that the US 
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saw the Alliance as more than a military organization. However, this thesis maintains that the 
reasons behind the US suggestion to study means of extending non-military cooperation were 
not based on a wish to reassure the smaller states, but to strengthen the unity of the Alliance in 
the face of peaceful coexistence. The fact is that the NATO allies all perceived a change in the 
nature of the Soviet threat, and that the larger powers recognized the need to strengthen the 
Alliance politically to meet this threat.  
Kaplan also maintains that the conclusions of the Committee of Three were not taken 
seriously, and that the Suez Crisis drowned out the voices of the Wise Men at the time. While 
it may well be said that the conclusions of the Committee were not acted upon, this was not 
because of the Suez Crisis. On the contrary, the Suez Crisis underlined these conclusions and 
reinforced the importance of the Committee‟s Report. The reasons for the lack of concrete 
results must lie elsewhere. This thesis has shown that the Norwegian and US attitude to non-
military cooperation, particularly political consultations, while seemingly positive on the 
surface, was actually quite negative. This was due to a basic unwillingness to undertake any 
cooperative measures that would mean relinquishing sovereignty or subjugating national 
interest to the interests of the Alliance and its membership.  
Regarding the view that the history of the transatlantic relationship is one characterized by 
conflict, the conclusions of this thesis agree with Lundestad‟s argument that the focus should 
rather be on the amount of cooperation, as well as on the fact that the Alliance has survived 
every conflict, and can be said to have emerged stronger every time. Similarly, Kaplan states 
that the striking aspect of NATO through the Cold War has been the silence over Article 13, 
which states that members can freely leave the Alliance after it has been in force for twenty 
years, despite the conflicts and disagreements. The work of the Committee of Three and the 
point that the Committee‟s report underlined the need for cooperation after the Suez Crisis 
can be seen as beneficial to cooperation, instead of the Suez Crisis being a demonstration of 
lacking willingness to consult. The focus should not be on Suez negating any results of the 
Committee, but on the possibility that the Committee was a factor in continued cooperation 
after Suez.     
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